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ABSTRACT: 
 
The development of a theoretical approach that sees any given economy as a 
vast array of interconnecting bonds between participants has come to identify 
the existence of firms’ networks. A fact that has been accompanied by the 
increasing importance of procurement, and supply management is the strategic 
function seeking to harness its full potential; to this regard the learning aspect of 
inter-organizational relationships should be carefully fostered when dealing with 
suppliers as a powerful mean to the attainment competitive advantages. 
 
The theoretical part of this research presents supporting arguments regarding 
the importance of a network approach towards procurement, while bridging it 
with an inter-organizational learning framework to produce a standpoint 
attempting to demonstrate the importance of the strategic supply network in 
terms of inter-organizational learning. The theoretical framework produced was 
applied to conduct the research using a case study method in three firms in the 
area of Vaasa. The main purpose of the study was to analyse the learning 
process within the strategic supply network of the firm through the views and 
behaviour of a hub company towards its main suppliers. 
 
The results indicate that learning is present in the relationship with what can be 
considered strategic suppliers; favourable conditions are present in the 
environment and the mechanisms implemented contribute to its achievement. 
However, learning and its outcomes seem to be diluted in the whole of the 
relationship, a fact that requires a deeper analysis to conclude that within 
strategic supply relationships two types of learning can be pointed at, learning 
as the overall performance of the supply relationship, and learning per se. 
KEYWORDS: Strategic network, supply management, inter-
organizational learning 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Introduction to the subject 
 
The importance of procurement has grown steadily over the last years to 
represent not only a significant cost that must be accurately managed, but also 
to an increasing extent suppliers are nowadays relied upon issues as design, 
development, and integration in managerial practices, activities aiming to 
increase a firm’s operations efficiency and efficacy; in addition, and as a result, 
today rivalry comprises not only directly competing firms, it spans to involve 
competing supply chains, a fact that has strengthened the strategic importance 
of the supply function (Gulati et al. 2000: 203; Ireland et al. 2002; Ford et al 
2003: 91 – 92). Authors, such as Araujo et al. (1999) or Dyer and Singh (1998), 
claim that the creation and preservation of competitive advantage lies in the 
formation of idiosyncratic and strong relationships with suppliers, making 
relation-specific investments which result in the development of new assets and 
resources, an idea that has lead many firms into the establishment of alliances 
with key partners in the industry. A nuclear source of value among them is the 
learning opportunity, a fundamental inspiration to innovation and creativity 
yielding value to all parties involved. 
 
 
The framework to approach this subject is found in the relational view of the 
firm, which way was prepared by the pioneering work of Thorelli (1986) and 
Håkansson (1989), who claimed that any whole economic system can be 
explained in terms of a vast arrangement of networks, formed by the 
relationships engaged by the economic agents to attain their objectives and 
aspirations. This vision has evolved throughout time gaining acceptance among 
scholars and practitioners and enlarged its theoretical framework, although 
frictions are not absent in its development. Nevertheless, the network approach 
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has proved a powerful explanatory tool on the subject of the strengths and 
weaknesses of firms, and moreover a network environment is vindicated to be a 
more efficient replacement of traditional arm’s-length relationship or vertical 
integration (Achrol 1997; Dyer and Singh 1998; Ireland et al. 2002; Möller et al. 
2005). 
 
 
The boundaries of the strategic supply network mark stronger bonds between 
participants, a fruitful area for the learning process (Ghosh 2004). However, 
regarding its learning outcomes, it is a complex process and its fertility depends 
on several elements found in the relationship environment, the mechanisms 
implemented by the partners, and the conditions of the knowledge that is to be 
learnt or created  (Inkpen 1998; Dyer and Nobeoka 2000). This study will delve 
into the learning process emerging from the strategic supply network, 
attempting to offer some light on the process and its characteristics. 
 
 
 
1.2. Purpose, scope and limitations of the study 
 
The main objective of the study is to analyse the learning process within the 
strategic supply network of the firm through the views and behaviour of a 
hub company towards its main suppliers. This will be examined through the 
following specific objectives: 
 
1. by establishing a link between the strategic supply network and the inter-
organizational learning theories, in an attempt to provide a joint 
theoretical approach to analyse the phenomena. 
 
2. by drawing a distinction between minor versus strategic suppliers and 
their characteristics, which will serve to analyse the latter. 
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3. by testing the distinction (if any) between emergent and sought strategic 
suppliers.  
 
4. by analysing the characteristics of the environment and the mechanisms 
used to attain learning in the relationship, and how they affect it. 
 
5. by examining what are the characteristics and outcomes of learning. 
 
 
These specific objectives are intended to clarify the main one through their 
separate and narrower approach on the subject. Despite the increasing amount 
of views on (strategic) supply networks, and also on inter-organizational 
learning, the number of studies combining both approaches is very limited 
despite a seemingly strong link between them. Thus, it is the intention of this 
study to provide a joint view on learning in strategic supply networks by 
reviewing and bridging the existent literature on the theoretical part, and testing 
its practical and empirical basis afterwards. In order to obtain a clear 
understanding of the process, especial attention will be given to the 
characteristics of the suppliers, the environment in which learning takes place 
and the mechanisms deliberately used in the process.  
 
 
The literature used in the review and analysis by which this study commences 
has been retrieved through the database access provided by the University 
Library Tritonia. It comprises mainly specialised articles and studies, published 
in renowned publications. Given the novelty of the theories presented here, the 
time frame expands just a little more than two decades, where the pioneering 
propositions can be found, to snowball after that in an increasing number of 
views and deeper insights into both organizational networks and inter-
organizational learning. The use of articles over the more structured views of 
books is argued to bring in a wider and fresher set of approaches, offering 
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complementing and opposing views that will help obtain, if not complete, a 
broad prospect on the issues covered. 
 
 
The empirical research will follow a multiple case study using a qualitative 
approach and as such the flaws and limitations of this type of research will be 
specifically pointed out later under the subheading referring to the 
trustworthiness of the study (see 4.4 Trustworthiness of the study). Empirically 
the research has been constricted to the study of learning within the strategic 
supply network of three hub companies, which belonging to separate mature 
industrial markets, have in common the internationality of their scope, a 
significant volume of operations located in the area of Vaasa that made them 
reachable, and their preeminent positions on their respective markets. Thanks 
to this basic characteristics production and marketing operations are carried out 
on a global scale, processes for which procurement is likewise managed 
globally; this fact provides the initial appealing ground on which to analyse the 
relations according to which the supply network is kept together, and specifically 
on the strategic category of procurement and the learning aspects present in it. 
The research focuses on the learning aspects present in the strategic supply 
network of the companies as a whole; the existence of specific learning 
relationships (i.e. joint development activities) is acknowledged, however their 
analysis is combined with the rest of the procurement relationships. The number 
of cases utilised in the empirical part of the study falls shorter than the desired 
amount due to the problematic caused by the current economic situation; 
nonetheless, the cases subject of study are expected to provide a fruitful insight 
into the research questions proposed, as it will be shown in the succeeding 
parts of this paper. 
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1.3. Terminology and key concepts 
 
Some of the terminology used in the study is introduced here: 
 
 
Strategic networks are defined by Gulati et al. (2000: 203) as relationships 
persisting over time, and which present a certain amount of strategic 
importance for the firms entering them. 
 
 
Strategic supply networks are defined by Gulati (1998: 293) as voluntary 
arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, or co-development of 
products, technologies, or services. 
 
 
Alliance designates any cooperative arrangement between two or more firms to 
improve their competitive position and performance by sharing resources; they 
are stable inter-organizational ties, which are strategically important to 
participating firms (Ireland et al. 2002: 413; Möller et al. 2005: 59). 
 
 
Organizational learning refers widely to the social production of organizational 
rules based on experience that leads to changes in organizational cognition and 
behaviour (Knight 2002; Holmqvist 2003). 
 
 
Inter-organizational learning in the words of Chang and Gotcher (2007) can be 
defined as “a joint activity between a supplier and customer in which the two 
parties share information which is jointly interpreted and integrated into a 
shared relationship-dominate-specific memory that changes the range or 
likelihood of potential relationship-domain-specific behavior”. 
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1.4. Structure of the study 
 
The study is divided in the following six parts (see also fig. 1): 
 
Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the subject and the objective of the study; 
along with the explanation of the motives that led to this research its limitations 
will be acknowledged, and a brief account of the main and central terminology 
of the succeeding parts will be offered. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the network theory notions and its implications, narrowing 
down to its strategic value. The supply network is highlighted afterwards, 
explaining the duality of the approach from a network and a dyadic perspective, 
signalling once more its important strategic value, and deepening into the 
sources of it, among which learning will be highlighted as the subject of study in 
the subsequent part. 
 
Chapter 3 delves into the learning process from the intra- and inter-
organizational point of view, and inquiries into its interconnection. The learning 
process will be explored from a network perspective, making use of a dyadic 
standpoint, inquiring into its characteristics, mechanisms, and functioning, 
unveiling the potential value that it can generate for a firm, illustrated by the 
exemplary case of Toyota. The chapter finishes with the framework that will be 
used to proceed in the empirical part of the study. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology and empirical approach of the study, 
presenting the data collection method, its analysis, and the possible issues 
concerning the trustworthiness of the study. 
 
Chapter 5 presents and discusses the empirical findings following the 
theoretical model proposed in the end of chapter 3, acknowledging other 
aspects related to the theoretical approach and the limitations of the research. 
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Chapter 6 summarises the study by recapitulating and offering a holistic view 
linking the different sections and offering lines that could be follow in future 
research and managerial suggestions on view of the findings. 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Structure of the study. 
 16 
2. BUSINESS NETWORKS AND STRATEGIC SUPPLY 
 
 
Along with the increasing attention received by the network paradigm (e.g. 
Håkansson and Snehota 1997; Dyer and Singh 1998; Gulati 1998; Gulati et al. 
2000; Håkansson and Ford 2002; Möller et al. 2005) the number of viewpoints, 
models, categorizations, descriptions and frameworks have consequently risen 
as well, which to some extent results in a conceptual confusion of the 
phenomenon itself (New and Mitropoulos 1995; Möller and Rajala 2007: 895). 
Hence, it is the intention of this chapter firstly to provide an introductory and 
brief outline of the evolution of the network paradigm. Presenting its major 
characteristics, a concise classification, and implications of the model, 
especially concerning its strategic importance. Secondly, to describe the 
importance of this view when applied to supply markets, portray the alliances 
that shape the strategic supply network, and provide a succinct summary of its 
beneficial outcomes pointing as well to its sources, which will serve as an 
introduction to the next chapter. 
 
 
 
2.1. The economy as a Network 
 
Thorelli (1986) presented a view that considered the market a continuum 
formed by different arrangements of labour division, from open market – an 
arm’s-length relation – to complete vertical integration. According to his views 
within the economic realm exist other distinctions than the two extremes, which 
he labelled networks, and suggested furthermore that any entire economy could 
be viewed as a vast arrangement of supplementary and interlaced networks. 
Thorelli (ibid.) also pointed out the potential applicability and use of this notion 
to industrial markets and international marketing. On the same lines, as these 
propositions, Håkansson (1989) presented a model of interconnected entities 
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that would describe any given economic system as an interdependent network 
of relationships. The interrelatedness depends on a variety of circumstances, 
especially on the relationship that connects them – supplier, customer, joint 
research efforts, complementary goods, to even credit granters in the banking 
sector – as time goes by these relationships will evolve and develop, some 
actors will draw together while others will be driven apart. 
 
 
Håkansson (1989: 17) presented his network model as a web connecting 
actors, activities, and resources, unified in the network thanks to the 
relationships that link them together. Activities are linked to resources since 
they either change them or make use of them, and actors ultimately are the 
ones who perform activities and control resources, having certain knowledge of 
both. This description has developed, gaining explanatory power in its 
descriptive potential of the economic scene, and providing a valuable approach 
to the key elements behind the ever-sought competitive advantage. 
  
 
 
Figure 2. The network model as proposed by Håkansson (1989: 17) 
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2.2.1. Characteristics of the network approach 
 
The network conception has developed over time and, what is widely regarded 
as the relational view of the firm today, is presented by different and also 
differing standpoints resulting in disparate theoretical constructions, not lacking 
a certain amount of conflict. Nevertheless, most of the authors agree in its basic 
assumptions; which Tikkanen and Halinen (2003), after reviewing the existent 
literature, have summarised to elaborate a succinct list describing the 
characteristics of the network approach. First, it is formed by a matrix of 
relationships, developed with other actors in order to gain access to their 
resources, and also to connect through them with broader networks of 
relationships. Second, companies are dependent on each other, what leads to a 
certain amount of vulnerability and loss of control. Third, networks evolve due to 
the interactions between participants, but in its most basic portrayal they are not 
coordinated nor managed by any of the members. Fourth, each actor perceives 
the network differently, being its own goals within the network different as well. 
Fifth, performance is interrelated within the network, thus each and every actor 
influences the performance of the rest. 
 
 
While most of the authors and views agree on the majority of these 
characteristics, a great deal of controversy has grown around the third one, 
causing a real schism in the literature between those who believe that some 
actors, especially the most powerful, could influence the evolution of the 
network through the creation and development of relationships (e.g. Jarillo 
1988; Jarillo 1993; Möller & Svahn 2003), and those who argue that such 
possibility would drive the network into some form of hierarchy, and thus 
shattering the very nature of the network approach (Håkansson and Ford 2002: 
137). This is an argument that ultimately refers to the ontological perspective of 
the network paradigm; networks conceived as emergent and rather anarchically 
structured against networks as purposely designed. 
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Authors drawing on economic sociology, social networks, and especially the 
industrial network approach or IMP1 group – represented especially by 
Håkansson, Ford and Snehota among others – explain and describe networks 
as spontaneous emergent systems, rather borderless, originated by the 
interaction of actors through time; whilst authors from the strategic management 
field and those close to the RBV2, argue that there are as well networks driven 
by the intention of the firms entering them, means to an end, which present 
agreed roles and coordination between actors. (Möller and Rajala 2007: 896; 
Tikkanen and Halinen 2003: 4). A clarification of the standpoint taken in this 
paper will be produced as I will come back to this issue later. 
 
 
Continuing with the attributes presented by the network theory from a 
managerial perspective, Ford et al. (2003: 42 - 60) distinguished three major 
dimensions when evaluating a network, which they named facets. First, 
relationships can be understood as an enhancing device to the firm’s efficiency, 
and an inspiration for innovation, which can be used furthermore to influence 
other parties, interrelating the internal structure of the firm with external 
important counterparts. Second, relationships can be seen as assets, and 
remarkably important ones since it is through them that resources and supplies 
are acquired, and ultimately customer problems solved, which is in the end the 
basic process to generate revenue. The third facet represents the taxing side, 
because, after all, relationships entail also problems to be faced, factual or 
potential, and have been described as unruly, undetermined, demanding, 
exclusive, and sticky. 
 
 
                                            
1 The Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group 
2
  Resource-based view 
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2.2.2. Network classification 
 
However the burgeoning amount of literature concerning the network approach, 
the attempts to present a classified categorization are not abundant (Möller and 
Rajala 2007: 896). Noteworthy exceptions are the work of de Man (2004), and 
especially Achrol (1997), who suggested to delve deeper into the matter, 
analyzing and measuring “density, multiplicity, and reciprocity of ties and a 
shared value system defining membership roles and responsibilities“ in order to 
present a classification. Möller and Rajala (2007: 898) followed this line of 
thought to present a series of recurrent dimensions and features, which help 
elaborating a categorization. First, attending to the structure of the network, 
vertical, horizontal or diagonal; second, the goal pursued; third, whether the 
network draws value by integrating specialized resources or seeks benefits from 
combining them; fourth, and last, whether the network operates in a pre-market 
competition or not. Even though there are not straightforward and distinct 
categorizations and the margins are vague, Möller and Rajala (2007: 897) 
pointed out a goal-orientation classification as the most comprehensive. 
 
 
Quasi integration 
Networks 
 
Supply and demand 
networks 
Technology-oriented 
networks 
 - Horizontal networks      - Vertical networks 
    - Solution networks 
 - R&D networks 
- Standardization networks 
Table 1. Network classification (Adapted from Möller and Rajala 2007: 897) 
 
 
According to the authors there are five categories, divided according to three 
major groups. The first group, quasi-integration networks, consist basically on 
horizontal agreements that seek market power (e.g. airline alliances). The 
second group, supply and demand, or customer-oriented networks, can be 
either vertical networks organized along the supply chain (e.g. Toyota), or 
solution networks between producers of complementary goods and services 
(e.g. IT-offerings). The third group consists on technology oriented networks, 
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split into R&D networks of companies participating in common projects and 
therefore sharing costs and risks (e.g. semiconductor research), and 
standardization networks, horizontal or diagonal arrangements intending to set 
a dominant technology (e.g. Symbyan coalition). (ibid.). 
 
 
Attending to more than a classificatory presentation the groups above and their 
characteristics signal the noteworthy nature of some sets of relationships, which 
can only be understood from the standpoint that recognizes the network as a 
structure to enhance the competencies of the firms involved, and thus 
understanding the network as sets of relationships organized and objective-
driven. Firms operate in the network due to a distinctly clear and specific 
ambition, which invests them with a remarkable strategic significance and 
acknowledges the value of the network as a creator of competitive advantage. 
 
 
2.2.3. The network as a source of competitive advantage 
 
Scholars have sought the sources of competitive advantage in different 
contexts and under diverse circumstances, and that is why different 
assumptions have evolved or have been replaced through time, in sought of the 
most explanatory hypothesis. The industry structure view, proposed by Porter 
(1980), kept these valuable sources within the boundaries of the industry where 
a firm operates; a proposition replaced by the resource-based view, which 
switched the attention from the industry to the collection of tangible and 
intangible resources possessed by the firm (see: Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; 
Rumelt 1991).  
 
 
Although Ireland et al. (2002: 427) considered the resource-based view a 
promising approach to study dyadic exchanges they argued that these 
propositions tended to constrict the centre of attention on the company’s 
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internal resources. On the contrary, to an increasing extent the focal point has 
taken a spatial step back, to consider the issues that affect a company 
externally. The source of competitive advantage is not only in a firm’s 
resources, but also to a great extent in those controlled by other parties with 
whom a company maintains relationships. This is the reason why more and 
more the focus is turning towards the environs where the firm operates in, 
towards the firm’s network. (Dyer and Singh 1998; Gulati et al. 2000; Tikkanen 
and Halinen 2003). 
 
 
Dimensions Industry Structure 
View 
Resource-Based 
View 
Relational View 
Unit of analysis Industry Firm Pair or network firms 
Primary sources 
of supernormal 
profit returns 
- Relative bargaining 
power 
- Collusion 
- Scarce physical 
resources 
- Human resources/ 
know-how 
- Technological 
resources 
- Intangible 
resources 
- Relation specific 
investments 
- Interfirm knowledge 
sharing routines 
- Complementary 
resource endowments 
Effective governance 
Mechanisms that 
preserve profits 
Industry barriers to 
entry 
 
 Government 
regulations 
 Production 
economies/ sunk 
costs 
Firm level barriers to 
imitation 
 
 Resource 
scarcity/ 
property rights 
 Causal 
ambiguity 
 Time 
compression 
diseconomies 
 Asset stock 
interconnectedn
ess 
 
Dyadic/network barriers 
 
 Causal ambiguity 
 Time compression 
diseconomies 
 Interorganizational 
asset stock 
interconnectedness 
 Partner scarcity 
 Resource 
indivisibility 
 Institutional 
environment 
 
Ownership/control 
of rent-generating 
process/resources 
Collective (with 
competitors) 
Individual firm Collective (with trading 
partners) 
Table 2. Comparing the Industry structure, RBV and Relational views of 
competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh 1998: 674) 
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Nowadays an increasing number of voices consider the relational view and the 
network environment as an efficient replacement of traditional markets and 
vertically integrated companies due to its better fit on today’s economic 
environment (e.g. Achrol 1997; Ireland et al. 2002; Möller et al. 2005). 
 
 
Håkansson (1989: 15 - 16) described the setting as firms “linked together by the 
fact that they either produce or use complementary or competitive products”, 
thus, within the environment, collaboration and discord are present. Companies 
are, therefore, neither free nor independent, instead they are nodes of a web, a 
complex setting where each interaction cannot be comprehended without the 
network itself (Ford et al. 2003: 18). As a result, the strategic standpoint has 
accordingly shifted its interest to a relational view of the company, as described 
by Dyer and Singh (1998: 660), where the advantages – and disadvantages – 
of a single company are frequently intertwined with those of the network of 
relationships it operates in. 
 
 
Gulati et al. (2000: 205 - 211) examined carefully the locus of value creation 
within a firm’s network by approaching the subject from five traditional sources, 
to which they applied a network lens. First, looking at the industry structure, the 
authors alleged the usefulness of understanding participants as embedded in 
networks of resources and information that influence greatly the competition 
and therefore profitability within the industry. Second, from the intra-industry 
structure point of view the network approach offers the possibility to delineate its 
arrangement; strategic groups could be identified, and more interesting cliques 
– groups locked and isolated from the rest – who may obtain a different 
profitability rate. Third, inimitable resources and capabilities could be traced 
within networks (e.g. information, capital, goods, or services). Fourth, 
contracting and coordination costs are higher from a network approach since 
opportunistic behaviour is comparatively more harmful; a firm’s act of 
opportunism will spread immediately, and a damaged reputation will influence 
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the rest of its relationships negatively. Fifth, the structure of any given network 
is shaped by endogenous forces – the formation or disband of an alliance has 
an effect on others – while exogenous environmental pressures influence its 
development as well. The sum of both may have important consequences for 
the participants due to lock-in and lock-out effects – ties with one actor place 
constraints with other – and learning races – firms engaged in an alliance race 
to squeeze the possible benefits of it, and afterwards dissolve it – it is 
noticeable how in the latter case confronted characteristics coexist, cooperative 
and competitive. By means of this five different sources Gulati et al. (2000) 
affirmed that the rents accruing to firms derive partly from their own resource 
endowment, but to a large extent from the structure and dynamics of the 
network to which they belong. 
 
 
 
2.3. Supply networks  
 
The importance of procurement has grown to an increasing extent in recent 
times due to a number of reasons. First, the percentage of cost represented by 
purchased goods and services has increased to account for a major share in 
the cost structure of most companies; Cousins and Spekman (2003: 19) 
considered on average a 65% of a firm’s sales. Second, companies rely and 
count on suppliers to design, develop, and produce substantial components of 
what will be their final product. Lastly, the third motive is the application of 
management techniques such as JIT3 or TQM4, which require to their full 
development the integration of suppliers. Supply has become thus an 
increasingly resource-demanding area and consequently the number of 
suppliers has been dramatically reduced while its weight in the firm’s 
environment is remarkably substantial. (Ford et al. 2003: 91 – 92). 
                                            
3
 Just In Time 
4
 Total Quality Management 
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Similar circumstances have been described as well by Trent (2005), who 
noticed how currently supply markets are tightening and as a result power is 
shifting towards a narrower tier of suppliers. Nevertheless, he considered that 
this narrow supply base is a crucial requirement to develop edge-cutting 
practices in supplier involvement and collaboration. Today there is a constant 
pressure to offer improvements, which falls ultimately in the firm’s suppliers – 
the reputation of a given industry lies in the quality and reliability of their 
external suppliers (ibid: 56) – therefore purchasing has evolved to become a 
strategic function that relies ever more in partnering-like practices, leading to 
increasingly competitive, flexible, and efficient production systems. Cousins and 
Spekman (2003: 20) have noted also that in the search of highly developed 
procurement systems, a global benchmarking has emerged, and the increasing 
competition is leaded by those able to build a worldwide sourcing net. 
Furthermore, firms do not longer compete one-to-one, but supply chain to 
supply chain, and since any given company is just as strong as its weakest 
supplier, managing supply strategically has become a very important task 
(Ireland et al. 2002: 414). These assumptions directly indicate that as 
competition intensifies, a firm’s network assumes increased strategic 
importance (Gulati et al 2000: 203.).  
 
 
In any case it is as well important to bear in mind that suppliers vary greatly in 
their skills and thus in the value they can generate for a firm. Araujo et al. 
(1999) alleged that their potential contributions might depend on how close their 
relationships are, and linked the future source of competitive advantage 
dependant on the type of relationship between a company and its suppliers. 
That is why in words of the same authors, arm’s-length is no longer a judicious 
decision, the emphasis and the priority lies in the pace from a transactional to a 
relational strategy, where partnering is becoming of the greatest importance. 
Dyer and Singh (1998: 661) argued, pointing at previous studies, that 
productivity gains in the value chain appear when the actors involved are willing 
to make relation-specific investments, merging individual resources that 
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materialize as inimitable idiosyncratic assets. Today companies not prominent 
in the past for their collaborative relationships acknowledge the boosting 
capacity of close involvement with suppliers to acquire, create, or make use of 
new resources (Araujo et al. 1999: 498). 
 
 
2.3.1. The strategic importance of supply networks 
 
Gulati et al. (2000: 203) define strategic networks as relationships persisting 
over time and which present a certain amount of strategic importance for the 
firms entering them; according to them such type of relationships are the fuel to 
develop new crucial capabilities. Thorelli (1986: 37, 46) foresaw the strategic 
implications of the network structure, not only as a substitute to vertical 
integration and diversification but also as an extension of the firm; he pointed 
the attention for future research on how strategic issues were linked to a firm’s 
network.  
 
 
It is a widely discussed fact that individual companies cannot longer master all 
the activities needed in the value chain of their respective industries (e.g. Achrol 
1997; Dyer and Singh 1998; Araujo et al. 1999; Ireland et al. 2002; Möller et al. 
2005). Firms are hollowing out and focusing on core competencies while relying 
on an array of other parties to provide the different goods and services on 
which, likewise, they have specialized (Ford et al. 2003: 91). From this account 
the strategic significance of suppliers and the supply network emerges naturally. 
The foundations of competitive advantage are located not only in those assets 
controlled by the firm and within its boundaries, but to a great extent in the 
access to others’ resources, and also in the interfaces developed with other 
parties (Håkansson and Snehota 1995; Dyer and Singh 1998). Thus a strategic 
supply network encompasses those relationships with suppliers where a 
significant degree of involvement is found, in a manner that Gulati (1998: 293) 
described as a “voluntary arrangement between firms involving exchange, 
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sharing, or co-development of products, technologies, or services”.  New and 
Mitropoulos (1995) assented to the importance of the strategic supply network 
view because it represents an alternative to the market-hierarchy dichotomy, 
underlining the stable but not static nature of inter-firm relationships, and also 
because it provides a framework to comprehend technological diffusion. 
However, they do not agree on the usefulness of the model after conducting a 
research, where they found out that its usefulness crumbles when taken into the 
real world; firms working as a single operational entity is not only a setting 
extremely hard to represent, but additionally constituted a conception too 
complex for managers to base their decision-making process on. Nonetheless, 
and although critical, they (ibid.) did not discard the applicability of the model 
but its ubiquity as it has been proposed. 
 
 
Another line of reasoning upon manageability and practical utilization of the 
network paradigm is provided by Möller and Rajala (207: 896), who argued that 
networks as an emergent construction of a firm’s relationships are rather 
unmanageable and thus the same applies to their strategic importance. 
However, strategic networks as purposely created – presenting agreed roles 
and objectives – must be manageable in order to be as efficient their primary 
intention states, otherwise, without that clear purpose, they would cease to be 
such and become mere relationships. 
 
 
Despite the clash of opinions, a third view has emerged, which in a roundabout 
manner avoids the latter argument and approaches the issue by looking at 
strategic supply networks from an atomistic point of view. This standpoint bears 
in mind that the network as a grid of relationships can be explained in terms of 
dyadic exchange simultaneously; as such, a strategic network can be viewed in 
terms of the strategic partnerships that form them, commonly referred to as 
alliances. (Anderson et al. 1994). 
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2.3.2. Alliances 
 
The literature5 has widely referred to relationships with a distinctive strategic 
importance as alliances, “cooperative arrangements between two or more firms 
to improve their competitive position and performance by sharing resources”, in 
words of Ireland et al. (2002: 413). A definition complemented by Möller et al. 
(2005: 59) as “stable inter-organizational ties, which are strategically important 
to participating firms”. 
 
 
Over the last years the interest towards the alliance phenomenon has grown 
significantly; the phenomenon itself has altered notably the economic scene, 
and therefore, neglecting the proliferation of alliances and the network in which 
firms are embedded leads to an insufficient appreciation and comprehension of 
firms’ functioning and performance (Gulati et al. 2000). Networks and alliances 
are shaped by their interdependence, as Gulati (1998: 293) observed how 
alliances are often found through or within the existing network of the firm, to 
revert on it, transforming the appearance and conditions of the latter, and once 
more strengthening its importance.  
 
 
Dacin et al. (2007: 169) gathered within the existing literature a plethora of the 
advantageous reasons sought by companies when establishing alliances, as 
entry into new markets, increase market power, acquisition and exchange of 
skills, strategic renewal, risk and investment sharing, economies of scale and 
scope, reductions in liabilities of foreignness, government and trade barriers, 
and the acquisition of institutional legitimacy. Furthermore, companies see in 
alliances a potential value-creating tool that lacks the risk of the M&A6 market 
(Ireland et al. 2002: 414), however, it should be noted that just as much as in 
the M&A cases, effective alliance management is a must in order to get hold of 
                                            
5
 For a literature review see Ireland et al. (2002: 416 – 426). 
6 Mergers and acquisitions. 
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its potential benefits and avoid difficulties or failure. Different types of 
relationships require differing needs and conditions, and likewise benefits and 
difficulties are associated with certain types of alliances (Trent 2005). In any 
case, the network perspective should not be forgotten and, thus, not only 
individual alliances should be optimized, but the whole network, unbolting its full 
potential (Gulati et al. 2000). 
 
 
 
Counterproductiv
e (Lose-Lose) 
 
Antagonistic 
relationships 
Work actively 
against each 
other’s needs 
Neither party takes 
responsibility for 
what happens in a 
relationship 
 
Destructive 
conflict occurs 
     
 
Competitive 
(Win-Lose) 
 
Adversarial 
or distributive 
relationships 
Engage in a 
competitive 
struggle to divide 
a fixed amount of 
value 
 
Attempt to 
maximize value for 
each side 
 
Minimal sharing 
of information 
     
 
Cooperative 
(Win-Win) 
 
Integrative 
relationships 
Longer-term 
relationships 
result from mutual 
goals 
Supplier 
involvement during 
product 
development 
increases 
Open sharing of 
information 
occurs, including 
sharing of cost 
data 
     
 
Collaborative 
(Win-Win) 
 
Creative 
relationships 
Congruence of 
goals and 
codestiny exists 
Jointly identify new 
market 
opportunities 
Jointly identify 
creative 
solutions to 
problems 
Table 3. The four C’s of supply relationships (Trent 2005: 54) 
 
 
Trent (2005) differentiated four different types of relationships between a firm 
and its suppliers, each one with specific characteristics, and not all of them 
beneficial, existing the possibility of harming both parties; anyhow, he 
highlighted the need for collaboration, advising that firms pursuing conflictive 
relationships with their major suppliers will soon find them increasing prices, 
allocating capacity and even sharing innovative ideas with others, who may be 
the firm’s direct competition. 
 
 
 30 
2.3.3. The value of alliances 
 
Möller and Rajala (2007: 895) observed that a key change in the economy of 
the 21st century is the pace from a dyadic exchange to a network standpoint 
regarding value creation. Yet drawing on the foregoing discussion, the dual 
point of view, strategic supply network and the alliances forming them are 
present in the sought of an explanation for the higher returns obtained by a 
networked environment. The authors (ibid.) argued that the amount and quality 
of the assets controlled by the members of the net influence directly the value 
generated and its capacity of renewal. 
 
 
Determinants of 
relational rents 
 Subprocesses facilitating 
relational rents 
   
 
1. Relation-specific assets 
 1a. Duration of safeguards 
  1b. Volume of interfirm transactions 
   
 
2. Knowledge-sharing routines 
 2a. Partner-specific absorptive capacity 
  2b. Incentives to encourage transparency and 
discourage free riding 
   
 
3. Complementary resources and 
capabilities 
 3a. Ability to identify and evaluate potential 
complementarities 
  3b. Role of organizational complementarities to 
access benefits of strategic resource 
complementarity 
   
4. Effective governance  4a. Ability to employ self-enforcement rather than 
third-party enforcement governance mechanisms 
  4b. Ability to employ informal versus formal self-
enforcement governance mechanisms 
 
Figure 3. Determinants of inter-organizational competitive advantage (Adapted 
from Dyer and Singh 1998: 663) 
 
 
The diagram above (fig. 3) introduces the characteristics used by Dyer and 
Singh (1998), who made use of a comparative analysis to prove the better fit of 
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an alliance due to its higher competitive aptitudes against the open market. A 
traditional arm’s-length relationship is characterized by non-specific 
investments, minimal information exchange, low interdependence, and low 
transaction costs. There is nothing idiosyncratic in such type of exchange and 
thus whichever combination of buyer-supplier will not generate above normal 
results due to their easily imitable configuration. The opposite characteristics 
can be found in an alliance, that is why, in words of the authors, the relational 
rents created outperform the traditional market-type arrangements, and 
furthermore relational rents once generated are preserved by mechanisms 
explained by the RBV theory – causal ambiguity and time compression 
diseconomies – and others added by the network framework, namely inter-
organizational asset interconnectedness, partner scarcity, resource indivisibility, 
and the network institutional environment. 
 
 
Ireland et al. (2002: 428 – 431) put forward an explanation of the possible 
strengths of an alliance approach, arguing that although the costs of strategic 
alliances are significant, their potential benefits overcome them. According to 
them, firms enter alliances for one or several of the following reasons. First, the 
access to others’ resources – Das and Teng (1998) distinguish financial, 
technological, physical and managerial – and the joint development of new 
ones; thanks to both the resource base of the firm is extended. Second, social 
capital resulting from the development of the relationship and thus being unique 
for every alliance, which serves to reach network’s resources and is found to be 
a great stimulus in the creation of breakthrough innovations. Third, the access 
to complementary resources; if similar resources build up current skills and 
economies of scale, dissimilar ones instead offer the possibility to develop new 
competitive advantages to face the ever-changing competitive scene, as it has 
been proved in the M&A market (Harrison et al. 1991). Fourth, the latter (ibid.) 
call also the attention towards the opportunity to learn new capabilities and take 
advantage of knowledge transfers between firms, making use of both to create 
new knowledge and boost innovation. 
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Summarising the work of Ireland et al. (2002) and Dyer and Singh (1998) the 
nuclear sources of value that emerge from a network perspective are especially 
two: resources widely understood, from fixed assets to social capital, goods or 
knowledge, and learning opportunity. On the one hand, resources could be split 
into independent ones, to which the firm has access thanks to the alliance and 
thus used as complementary to its own, and furthermore, and more important, 
due to its high specificity, ambiguous, and inimitable creation process, relational 
assets which have originated due to the interaction of firms. On the other hand, 
the learning opportunity emerging from the tight interaction on the alliance 
environment can be regarded as a fundamental inspiration to innovation and 
creativity. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that in order to successfully 
exploit these resources and learning opportunities, an alliance-focused 
management function must take good care of its development and governance. 
 
 
Summarising, this chapter has introduced the network approach, described its 
major characteristics, and discussed its validity, presenting contrasting views in 
order to provide a whole understanding of the issue. The network strategic 
significance has been advanced prior to narrowing the focus on procurement, 
and reassured by demonstrating the importance of the network approach 
regarding the growing importance of the supply function. Alliances have been 
presented as a basic constituent of the network, providing a nuclear, and 
somewhat easier, empirical approach on the subject. Therefore, the value of the 
strategic supply network has been demonstrated, advancing to some extent the 
forthcoming review on the subject of inter-organizational learning, which 
substantially contributes to the strategic importance of the supply network 
through the outcomes produced by the learning process. 
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3. LEARNING IN NETWORKS 
 
 
As it has been presented in the foregoing discussion, among the many 
beneficial outcomes in the development of supplier relationships, an 
outstanding result is the learning process engaged by the partners, and its 
repercussions throughout both companies and the relationship itself. For that 
reason, in order to deepen into this matter this chapter will introduce first, the 
basics of organizational learning, establishing the locus of learning, how it can 
be found in infra- and supra-organizational levels, and accordingly introduce the 
notion of inter-organizational learning. Second, it will be explained how the 
strategic network acts as a very efficient learning catalyst through a dyadic 
perspective, the explorative and exploitative approaches of learning, and what 
the problems are concerning inter-organizational learning. Third, the process of 
inter-organizational learning will be explained according to different views, 
inquiring into the factors and mechanism that makes it possible, illustrated by 
the leading example of Toyota. Fourth and lastly, a summary and the research 
framework for the succeeding part of the study will be introduced. 
 
 
 
3.1. Organizational learning 
 
It is interesting to notice that none of the theories concerning learning at any of 
the supra-individual levels are actually based on the observation of an 
organization’s behaviour (Ghosh 2004: 303). Organizational learning takes 
place when an individual makes discoveries, inventions, and evaluations, which 
influence the organization and modifies its patterns of behaviour and its basic 
premises of action; in brief, individuals learn on behalf of the organization 
(Holmqvist 2003: 98). Nevertheless, a vast amount of literature has addressed 
inter-organizational learning from a great variety of approaches: inter-firm 
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learning (Dyer and Singh 1998), learning networks (Knight 2002), learning in 
alliances (Larsson et al. 1998), or supply chain learning (Bessant et al. 2003). 
Holmqvist (2003: 96 - 98) examined the views on the subject to present a 
summary addressing the four main and widely most referred attributes in the 
inter-organizational learning arena. First, learning is experiential, and as such is 
permanently evolving. Second, learning is a process shaping continuously and 
rather permanently the organizational behaviour. Changes in beliefs and 
preferences seem to occur simultaneously, and thus they appear to be the 
cause as much as the result of behavioural change. Third, learning takes place 
at the individual level, which at the same time is embedded in a social context. 
Groups of individuals strive to make sense of the reality and context that 
surrounds them; by and by inferences are drawn, ideas bargained with the rest, 
and finally recorded and stored in the organizational memory. Fourth, learning is 
regulated by the rules of the organization, and thus filtered through the 
subjective views of the organization. 
 
 
Attending to these four facets the author defined organizational learning as “the 
social production of organizational rules based on experience that leads to a 
changed organizational behaviour” (ibid.). However, in view of the arguments 
presented by Crossan et al. (1995) further clarification is required concerning 
what is meant by a changed organizational behaviour. The latter put forward a 
model in which learning is explained as the outcome of two elements, 
behavioural and cognitive change. It is the combination of these two what 
generates learning, as the figure shows (fig.4). Attending to this conception, the 
existence of behavioural change must be accompanied by cognitive change; if 
any of the two is absent then learning is either blocked or forced, which 
ultimately results in no learning whatsoever. To this respect it is important to 
keep in mind that even though learning is an independent process, and as such 
takes place within the individual, the organizational context influences the same 
individuals whose learning processes together will reshape the organization 
itself. 
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Figure 4. An integrative model of learning outcomes (Crossan et al. 1995: 351) 
 
 
Knight (2002: 432) proposed that in order to identify organizational learning that 
could be taken as such, behavioural and cognitive changes must also endure 
despite the turnover of personnel. It is important to note, nevertheless, that 
these persisting changes do not necessarily have to affect the whole 
organization; given complex organizational structures the process of knowledge 
transfer is assisted (and hindered) by other factors. 
 
 
Taken these supplementary assessments into account, the previous definition 
of organizational learning can be revised and extended as: the social production 
of organizational rules based on experience that leads to changes in 
organizational cognition and behaviour. However, given the purpose of this 
study it is necessary to complement it with the views of Chang and Gotcher 
(2007: 479), who defined inter-organizational learning as “a joint activity 
between a supplier and customer in which the two parties share information 
which is jointly interpreted and integrated into a shared relationship-dominate-
specific memory that changes the range or likelihood of potential relationship-
domain-specific behavior”. 
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3.1.1. The locus of learning 
 
Prior to delve deeper into the inter-organizational learning perspective it is 
necessary also to differentiate the learning process by learner and learning 
context, an issue raised by Knight (2002: 437 – 440), who introduced the 
following matrix (fig. 5) to analyse the learning subject and the locus of learning. 
 
 
  Context of learning 
L
e
v
e
l 
o
f 
le
a
rn
e
r 
 Individual 
(I) 
Group 
(G) 
Organizational 
(O) 
Dyadic 
(D) 
Inter-organizational 
(I-O) 
Individual 
(I) 
     
Group 
(G) 
     
Organization 
(O) 
     
Dyad 
(D) 
     
Network 
(N) 
     
Figure 5. Cross-tabulation of level of learner and context of learning (Knight 
2002: 438) 
 
 
This model despite its simplicity proves to be a valuable tool to draw a 
distinction, establish and distinguish forms of learning. However, it does not lack 
deficiencies and flaws as the author (ibid.) has acknowledged. First related to 
the atomized vision present in the cells forming the diagonal, especially in the 
case of a single individual learning alone, which does not hold since learning 
takes place in a social environment. Second, the learning context as stated for 
the columns proves correct for the cells above the diagonal (e.g. an individual 
learning in an organization), but context turns into catalyst below the diagonal 
(e.g. an organization’s learning is influenced by an individual). Nevertheless, the 
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model serves its purpose of graphical explanation to determine which levels of 
learning are being discussed, and who is learning thanks to which environment. 
For the purpose of this paper, following Knight (2002: 439), inter-organizational 
learning will be analysed as learning occurring in a dyadic or in an inter-
organizational setting, where the learner could be an individual, a group, an 
organization, the dyad or the network itself (fig. 6). 
 
 
  Context of learning 
L
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f 
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I      
G      
O      
D      
N      
Figure 6. Locus of inter-organizational learning (Knight 2004: 439) 
 
 
 
3.2. Learning in the network 
 
The benefits of integration and collaboration with other firms have been widely 
acknowledged, a reasoning that Noteboom (1992) used to propose that it not 
only renders purely economic outcomes, but the combination of assets between 
organizations and their social interconnecting laces may lead to a prosperous 
blossom of learning capabilities and knowledge outcomes. “Unlike most assets, 
organizational knowledge can actually grow when shared”, claimed Inkpen 
(1998: 75). Therefore, the same rationale used by the relational view – as seen 
in the preceding chapter – can be applied also to a learning perspective. 
Bångens and Araujo (2002) posed that just as firms do not develop new 
capabilities in isolation but by making use of the resources available within their 
network, the authors claimed the nonexistence of independent learning by a 
firm based solely in its own skills. Learning is highly dependent on the talent 
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and aptitudes of the firms with which relationships are maintained; moreover, a 
firm left to its own will soon find out that the development of new abilities is 
costly, slow and ultimately very difficult (ibid.). This is consistent with the 
Vygotskian perspective of learning presented by Ghosh (2004: 306), who 
considered that learning occurs first at a social level and therefore it is an 
outcome of social interaction. Based on the social embedment of the learning 
process organizational learning is thus argued to be dependent on the 
organization’s network (Inkpen 1996; Bångens and Araujo 2002; Holmqvist 
2003). 
 
 
Following the same atomising reasoning applied in the previous section 
concerning network manageability, Holmqvist (2003: 101) constructed its views 
concerning learning in networks using the alliance as the cornerstone of the 
inter-organizational learning phenomenon, stressing that inter-organizational 
collaboration occurring in the inter-firm level is in itself a distinctive and 
remarkable learning entity. Due to their nature, alliances promote an 
environment that encourages the sharing and transfer of knowledge, which acts 
as a mechanism creating competitive advantage by synthesising each partner’s 
skills, and yielding value by the establishment of joint learning, stimulating the 
creation of new products, technologies, and competencies (Dyer and Singh 
1998; Ghosh 2004).  
 
 
Alliances have become necessary in a great number of markets and industries, 
markedly in the high-technology sector, and strategic management is aware of 
the value that knowledge transfers can bring to the company (Parise and 
Henderson 2001: 908). Huber (1991: 97) put it forward simply by advising that 
inter-organizational learning is “faster than acquisition through experience and 
more complete than acquisition through imitation”. 
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Following the research of Hagerdoon (1993), Inkpen (1996) noted how the 
leading motives to enter an alliance fall to a large extent in the learning area; 
along with the prospective gains in market access and market influence, two 
learning-related stimulus are present, namely technology complementarities 
and innovation time-span reduction. Ghosh (2004: 304) has also noticed how 
firms enter an alliance only after evaluating the potential of the other party. 
Using his metaphor, alliances act as a window to reach over the capabilities of 
the partner, through which learning is facilitated, providing opportunities for 
partners to transfer and acquire knowledge. Thus, the examination of alliances 
proves to be an important tool to understand inter-organizational learning. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that the formation of an alliance is an intrinsic 
recognition of a partner’s skills and usefulness by the focal firm (Inkpen 1998). 
 
 
3.2.1. Learning strata – Exploitation & exploration 
 
Holmqvist (2003: 99) argued that if any organization would learn exclusively 
from experience, it would certainly contribute to its current activities; this is 
indeed the way firms gain productivity and refine their production and routines. 
However, trough the exploitation process eventually a firm may become skilfully 
incompetent in the long run by not pursuing other sources of knowledge. On the 
other hand, exploration on search of other sources of inspiration requires 
experimenting, innovating, and ultimately taking risks. These two processes are 
rather contradictory in nature, and thus the dilemma of counterbalancing their 
effects. Organizations need to explore new paths while exploiting what they 
already know; generally exploitation relates to intra-organizational learning, 
whereas exploration is associated with inter-organizational learning. A major 
reason is the absence of a formal chain of authority, allowing for explorative 
views to flourish according to a wider range of deviations available, provided by 
a more democratic organization.  
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Figure 7. A dynamic model of intra- and inter-organizational learning (Holmqvist 
2003: 114). 
 
 
Holmqvist (2003: 107) argued that there is a relationship linking exploitation and 
exploration to the processes of intra- and inter-organizational learning (fig. 7). 
Learning involves a transformation occurring within and between organizations, 
namely, acting, opening-up, experimenting and focusing. The transitions 
between these phases are rather abrupt and depend on the similarities between 
partners. Exploitative extension and internalization are due to similar 
experiences, while explorative extension and internalization are ascribed to 
diversity in experience. Through this framework Holmqvist (ibid.) argued that a 
complete understanding of organizational learning requires an inter-level 
analysis of intra- and inter-organizational learning, asserting that their 
interactions play a fundamental role in the study of learning processes. 
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3.2.2. Inter-organizational learning drawbacks 
 
Drawing into the problems related with learning in an alliance and the network, 
Inkpen (1998: 76) described the following, and highlighted especially the first 
two. First, it always exists the risk of knowledge spillover; a firm’s partner might 
get access to vital information on technology, systems, or procedures and flee 
with it. However, the chances on the contrary to happen are just as likely and 
therefore it would be possible to capitalize the spillover produced by a partner. 
Second, engaging in an alliance as a substitution to knowledge that a firm could 
generate on its own creates a harmful dependency, the alliance will break if the 
partner does not find it fruitful and the focal firm will most likely perceive how its 
competitive advantage has been eroded. Third, paradoxically it is logical to 
think that the more a firm learns in an alliance, the less remains to be learned; 
therefore, it exists the possibility of firms seeking alliances to suck its 
possibilities and disengage immediately afterwards. A contrasting view is that 
an alliance should bring in challenging issues and thus nurturing the path for 
continuous evolution. Fourth, from a strictly economic point of view, Inkpen 
(1996) also advised to look for a cost efficient balance; a firm engaging in 
knowledge creation must compare beforehand the profitability and costs of an 
alliance attempt. It should be noted that it includes keeping in mind not only the 
overall assessment of an alliance, but each of the mechanisms enforced in 
order to transfer knowledge and thus for learning to occur. 
 
 
 
3.3. The process of inter-organizaitonal learning 
 
Inkpen (1998: 71) noted that even though the learning process and knowledge 
acquisition may seem rather random and unplanned it is not a haphazard 
process; an organization can create structures and mechanisms to facilitate it. 
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Figure 8. Capturing the dynamics of Vygotskian inter-organization learning in 
alliances (Ghosh 2004: 308). 
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Ghosh (2004: 308) put forward a concept map (fig.8) in which he explained how 
learning takes place. It all starts in the individual level, and through the 
socialization process, alliance partners assimilate each other’s points of view 
and gain knowledge of the problem. Afterwards, individuals must turn the tacit 
information into explicit in an attempt to find solutions to the problem. 
Resources and activities will be combined, monitored, coached if needed, and 
the final expected performance will be compared with the actual result. The gap 
between the performance expected and the real outcome will set the process in 
motion again, after introducing modifications, and so on until the outcome turns 
out as it is desired, thus the learning process is continuously reinforced and 
reshaped each time. 
 
 
Although the concept map above offers a good explanation on how the process 
works, several pieces are missing, as the actual mechanisms used and the 
characteristics that the environment should comply with in order for learning to 
take place. Exploring the ideas of Inkpen (1996; 1998) another model can be 
submitted (fig. 9), and although simpler it explains plainly and straightforwardly 
the environment and the mechanisms needed for learning to occur. 
 
 
3.3.1. Learning mechanisms, setting and conditions 
 
Inkpen (1996) argued about the existence of six factors that provide the right 
environment, easing and encouraging inter-organizational learning. Flexible 
learning objectives; a common and clear goal is imperative for the alliance to 
exist, however, learning objectives should not be rigid. Management must be 
flexible to adjust them if problems arise, otherwise the endeavour will be 
fruitless. Leadership commitment; top management must be committed to 
knowledge creation, guiding the process and making it happen. A climate of 
trust; trust has been regarded elsewhere as a critical catalyst in the free 
exchange of information between two different parties. Tolerance for 
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redundancy; the overlap of information, activities and management 
responsibilities should be dealt with in terms that encourage dialogue and 
understanding, very valuable elements in the learning process. Creative chaos; 
confusion is likely to arise due to the disruption of normal routines, increasing 
tension; chaos should be turned to a constructive way, to solve the problems. 
Performance myopia; especially managerial levels should learn how to deal with 
this issue since poor figures concerning short-term results or financial 
performance should not be discouraging, it does not mean that learning is not 
happening and that it will not yield value. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Environment, mechanisms and conditioning factors in the process of 
inter-organizational learning (Adapted from Inkpen 1996 and Inkpen 1998) 
 
 
Through the usage of case studies Inkpen (ibid.) inquired as well into the 
mechanisms needed to attain learning in an alliance, finding four critical ones. 
Technology sharing; firms put in place different systems to acquire and share 
the information needed with the partner, from the traditional meetings to cutting-
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edge IT7 systems. Interaction; cooperation between partners helps the creation 
of communities of practice; members of both parties acquire the other’s point of 
view, creating a beneficial link between firms. Personnel transfers; staff rotation 
is a very efficient measure to set knowledge in motion; those mobilised will be 
aware of different perspectives and spread the knowledge acquired along their 
path, making the learning process more fluid and easier. Linkages between 
strategies; if the goal of the alliance is seen as secondary by the focal 
organization it will lessen the likelihood of learning opportunities to take place. 
The goals of both organisations must be aligned and the learning opportunity 
should receive sufficient attention to maximize its profitability. 
 
 
To summarise the ideas of Inkpen (1996), effective knowledge creation in an 
alliance depends on the utilization of two elements, mechanisms to access and 
transform knowledge, and an adequate climate facilitating those processes. 
However, later on the author added two additional conditions that firms must be 
able to overcome (Inkpen 1998: 73 – 77), accessibility and learning 
effectiveness. The accessibility of knowledge is dependent on two separate 
components, protectiveness and tacitness. The protectiveness of a partner over 
its own knowledge will depend on the competitive overlap existing between 
firms in the alliance; along with the development of the relationship trust will 
increase and also mutual understanding, thus protectiveness will be reduced. 
Apart from this, a firm engaged in a learning process will try to make sense of a 
combination of explicit and tacit knowledge, the latter is harder to understand 
given its invisibility and intangibility, being embedded in personal beliefs, 
experiences, and values. Trying to understand tacit knowledge is hard, but the 
more tacit the more likely it is that the knowledge is valuable. Unfortunately 
there are no clear mechanisms to deal with tacit information, except for a full 
immersion that will help understand it. 
 
                                            
7 Information Technology 
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Regarding learning effectiveness especially three factors need to be taken care 
of. First, the establishment of knowledge connections; knowledge transfers 
require connections for the information to be conveyed, through formal and 
informal relationships linking individuals and groups. Second, the relatedness of 
knowledge, if new knowledge overlaps with the existent it is easier to 
understand, and viceversa. But it should be taken into account that dissimilar 
knowledge powers the learning opportunity, and although more difficult to 
generate, the outcome is likely to be much more valuable. Third, cultural 
alignment is necessary; although expectations are likely to be the same, 
different assumptions by the parties and different corporate cultures generate 
frustration about objectives, performance, and the alliance and relationship 
itself. 
 
 
Ghosh (2004: 305) remarked that overall it is the initial “divergence in 
convergence” that sets the process in motion, what Holmqvist (2003: 103) 
regarded as the confrontation and combination of individual organizational 
experiences. Two organizations with different histories, structures, and 
processes are indeed likely to be different but nevertheless sharing the same 
vision provides the motivation needed. Individuals will construct a novel 
perception of reality by overlapping and combining their individual standpoints, 
finding gaps and reframing their mental maps. The interaction between two 
established bodies of knowledge often result in new developments (Håkansson 
1989: 36). Ghosh (2004: 307) referred to it as the collective zone of proximal 
development8 – ZPD – to differentiate the level at which a learner can function 
unassisted and the level to which a learner could be taken with assistance. 
Learning takes place in the collective ZPD due to the interaction of individuals, 
which awakens internal processes, and in the same manner firms enhance their 
performance and development assisted by other organizations. 
                                            
8 The zone of proximal development (ZPD) was first introduced by Vygotsky (1978). 
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3.3.2. The Toyota case 
 
Toyota has become a leading light in managerial approaches, and the way it 
has managed its supply and production network is one of the brightest 
examples, which illustrates the elements described in the precedent 
subheading. In Toyota they have understood that the cost and quality of its 
vehicles depend on the network of firms working with them, and also that the 
same network is a crucial element when it comes to learning, a key to 
competitive success (Dyer and Nobeoka 2000: 346). The authors explain 
Toyota’s success thanks to the development of bilateral and multilateral 
knowledge-sharing routines with suppliers, which result in a superior learning 
ability, overcoming the three major dilemmas associated with knowledge 
sharing (ibid. 348). First, motivating self-interested network members to 
participate and openly share their valuable knowledge. Second, the issue 
known as the “collective action” or the “free rider” problem. Third, maximizing 
the efficiency of knowledge transfers among a large group. 
 
 
Toyota’s solutions 
Network identity Knowledge protection and 
value appropriation 
Multiple knowledge-sharing 
processes and sub-networks 
 Supplier association 
 Consulting teams / 
problem solving 
teams 
 Voluntary learning 
teams 
 Inter-firm employee 
transfers 
 There is no 
proprietary 
knowledge. 
 Production know-
how is openly 
shared. 
 Bilateral and multilateral 
knowledge-sharing 
processes. 
Table 4. Toyota’s solutions to knowledge-sharing, based on Dyer and Nobeoka 
(2000). 
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Toyota has promoted a philosophy encouraging the creation of a shared 
network identity – kyoson kyoei – by setting in motion a network-based 
knowledge acquisition, storage, and diffusion. The basic and more important 
tools to achieve it have been the creation of a supplier association, a network-
level consulting division, a sub-network of voluntary learning teams among its 
suppliers, and the development of a system of inter-firm job rotation. These 
have created a real identity and a sense of belonging among its suppliers. The 
protection of valuable knowledge and also the “free riding” problem have been 
solved simply by eliminating the notion of “own knowledge” – at least within 
certain domains – and by openly sharing all production know-how. Any 
knowledge possessed by Toyota or any of its suppliers is accessible to any 
other member of the network, and the owner is in fact the network itself. Finally, 
the last implementation was the creation of multiple knowledge-sharing 
processes and sub-networks within the network; some serve the purpose of 
knowledge creation while others are designed for its diffusion, constituting very 
effective generators and efficient conveyors of tacit and explicit knowledge. 
(Dyer and Nobeoka 2000: 351 – 360; Dyer and Hatch 2004). 
 
 
In summary, the authors argued and proved, using the exemplifying case of 
Toyota, how a network can be more effective than an independent firm 
regarding generation, transfer, and recombination of knowledge to boost its 
learning capabilities and collecting its full potential while all the parties benefit 
from it. The drawback, as acknowledged by the authors (ibid. 365) is the 
possibility, as time goes by, of a diminishing diversity within the network – the 
recurrent interaction will reshape all participants to present homogenous 
characteristics over a period of time – and thus a decreasing ability to produce 
new knowledge, and also the risk of the network becoming so inwardly focused 
over time that it will be unable to produce innovations, or even adopt them from 
the outside. Nevertheless, Toyota has identified these potential issues as well 
and established mechanisms to prevent them through scanning groups that will 
detect “best practices” outside the network. 
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3.4. Conclusions and theoretical framework of the study 
 
The increasing relevance of the network paradigm and its strategic value has 
been related to the growing importance of the supply chain along with its 
potential benefits in the second chapter. The third one has presented the 
learning aspects present in the network environment, the influencing factors 
and mechanisms needed for learning to take place. The intention of this 
summary is to introduce the theoretical framework that will be used in this study 
by bringing together the strategic supply network and the learning processes 
taking place at the inter-organizational level. 
 
 
The study will follow a deepening pace to draw a distinction within the supplier 
network between minor and strategic suppliers, and furthermore a 
distinguishing attempt on how they are related to the focal company, whether 
they were emergent from the existent set of relationships, or expressly sought 
within or through it. The figure below (fig. 10) will be used to portray the supply 
network on each case; taking into account the amount suppliers, these will be 
divided between peripheral minor suppliers, and the more nuclear strategic 
ones, which will be likewise divided into emergent and sought suppliers. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The supplier network strata used for the study. 
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Once these preliminary distinctions have been drawn, those belonging to the 
strategic network will be analysed in terms of the key aspects determining the 
environment, the mechanisms used, and the influence of conditioning factors, 
as described by Inkpen (1996; 1998), and illustrated on the next diagram (fig. 
11).  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Theoretical framework of the study. 
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As it can be observed each major aspect will be investigated through an in-
depth analysis of their respective components, an evaluation that will help to 
provide a clearer evaluation of learning in strategic supply networks. The 
facilitating factors will accounted for by the examination of flexible learning 
objectives, leadership commitment, trust, tolerance for redundancy, creative 
chaos, and performance myopia. The mechanisms will be appraised by 
analyzing the information and technology sharing between firms, their 
interactions, personnel transfers among participants, and the partner strategic 
link. The conditioning factors present a twofold division, accessibility, which will 
be evaluated considering the protectiveness and tacitness of the knowledge 
subject of transfers between firms, and learning effectiveness, whose analysis 
focuses on the knowledge connections between firms, the relatedness of that 
knowledge, and the cultural alignment of the participants. It is expected that this 
analysis will offer valuable insights of the learning process, and moreover its 
interconnection and interdependence with a firm’s network. 
 
 
To sum up, the functioning of learning has been described along this chapter 
following a logical path that introduced first the foundations of what is 
understood as organizational learning, followed by a description of inter-
organizational learning, and the determination of its locus. Learning in the 
strategic supply network is accordingly described as inter-organizational 
learning in a networked environment, stressing the distinction, as much as the 
relationship, between the exploitative and explorative aspects of learning, and 
also providing an account of the possible drawbacks of inter-organizational 
learning. Toyota’s example represents a firsthand empirical examination of a 
successful learning process between a firm and its suppliers. The conclusion of 
the chapter provides a description of the process of inter-organizational 
learning, whose major and minor constituents will be the subject of study in the 
following empirical investigation. 
 52 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter will first introduce the methodology used on this research, justifying 
the approach chosen and acknowledging also its limitations. Second, the data 
collection method will be described. Third, an account will be provided on the 
system followed to analyse the data. Fourth, an exposition of the study’s 
trustworthiness will be presented, attending to its credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability; to what they refer and how they are achieved. 
 
 
 
4.1. Research approach 
 
The literature has traditionally drawn a borderline that separates research into 
quantitative and qualitative methods and studies, which refer to the means used 
in order to collect and analyse data. Quantitative methods make use of 
standardized proceedings that fit large amounts of responses into 
predetermined categories, facilitating comparison and statistical analysis, being 
its formalized and well-structured results its main advantage (Patton 1988: 9).  
 
 
On the other hand, qualitative data provides in-depth, rich and detailed 
information, allowing the researcher a higher degree of freedom since data 
collection is not constrained by a preset sorting (ibid.). As Denzin and Lincoln 
(1994: 6) posed it, each tradition is governed by its own genres, classics, 
representations, interpretations, and evaluations methods, owing to their 
differing epistemology towards the use of positivism, acceptance of postmodern 
sensibilities, capturing the individual’s point of view, examining the constraints 
of everyday life, and securing rich descriptions. 
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Quantitative research emphasises mathematical models, statistical tables and 
graphs, while qualitative analysis uses ethnographic prose, historical narratives 
and first-person accounts (ibid.); both have their strengths and weaknesses, 
and thus the best method is the one best suited to the research purpose and its 
questions (Yin 2003: 7). 
 
 
The research purpose of this study will be fulfilled using a qualitative case study 
approach. According to Yin (2003: 13) a case study is an empirical analysis that 
“investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident”; the qualitative approach is also argued by Yin (2003: 6) to suit most 
often case studies. 
 
 
Given the rather abstract nature of the “learning” process, and ,furthermore, its 
high dependency on the environment in which it is embedded, a qualitative 
case study approach is most convenient to offer a deep insight on the 
environment, mechanisms and factors that best strengthen the processes and 
outcomes of learning in the strategic supply network. Yin (2003: 2) claimed that 
case studies allow retaining the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-
life events, and moreover that they are distinctly useful when the subject is 
broad and complex in nature, and therefore better studied within its specific 
context. 
 
 
The literature review has followed a deductive approach in order to create a 
theoretical framework, which will guide the empirical part of the study; however, 
an inductive standpoint will be taken into account as well to describe the 
phenomena emerging from the different cases. Additionally an exploratory 
stance will be followed regarding what are the mechanisms and conditions 
needed for learning to take place, and a more explanatory one to describe how 
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the strategic supply network is related to learning outcomes; as argued by Yin 
(2003: 5) each strategy has its characteristics, existing large overlaps and no 
hierarchy to arrange them. 
 
 
 
4.2. Data collection 
 
Data can be classified following a basic twofold criterion; primary data, which is 
collected ad hoc to answer a particular question by the researcher, and 
secondary data, which is existent data previously gathered for other purposes. 
This study makes use of both types; firstly, the use of secondary data has been 
key to arrange a theoretical framework that guides the empirical part of the 
study, with which the empirical part proceeds; secondly, primary data has been 
gathered following the schedule marked by the theoretical framework to tackle 
the questions posed in the purpose of this study. 
 
 
The methodology followed is what Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 237) labelled the 
instrumental case study, in which “a particular case is examined to provide 
insight into an issue or refinement of theory. The case is of secondary interest; it 
plays a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of something else”. In this 
study, three instrumental case studies were conducted, what the authors (ibid.) 
consider a collective case study. The intention is to test the validity of the 
theoretical framework constructed and answer the purpose of this study. This is 
consistent with the views of Yin (2003: 97), who suggest the use of multiple 
sources when conducting case studies, a notion known as triangulation that 
benefits from the use of various sources to inquire into the same facts of the 
phenomenon subject of study.  
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The secondary data constituting the first part of this paper has been collected 
from relevant literature, particularly from the work of Inkpen (1996; 1998) as it 
has been observed earlier on (see 1.2. Purpose, scope and limitations of the 
study). As for the primary data, Patton (1990: 10) indicates three methods to 
collect primary data, open-ended interviews, direct observation, and written 
documents; whilst Yin (2003: 85) suggests the use of documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation, and physical 
artefacts. In the case of this study primary data collection was obtained by 
open-ended interviews carried out between May and June 2009 conducted with 
knowledgeable and experienced members on each of the organisations studied 
(see appendix 1), who in two of cases produced additional information by 
written and computerised documentation. The questions for the interviews were 
posed according and following the theoretical framework (see appendix 2).  
 
 
Given the elusive and at times intangible nature of the factors subject to study, 
interviews were considered the best option to gain a rich insight the issue; to 
facilitate a deeper understanding of the research problem interviews were open-
ended, thus providing the opportunity to discuss on a much more free manner 
each of the aspects subject of study. General information regarding the 
company was obtained via their respective corporate websites; these basic 
facts and figures provide a background that helps understanding the 
environment to which each of the companies belongs, and the history behind 
each case. 
 
 
The interview questions, broken down under major subjects – characteristics of 
the supply network, learning facilitating factors, learning mechanisms, 
conditioning factors, and learning itself – were sent beforehand, and all the 
interviewees had had the time to have a look at them prior to the interview. The 
questions were written in English and the same language was used in the 
interviews, given the fact that it was the only common language and they were 
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all proficient users. The interviews were maintained face-to-face, using a 
recorder to obtain a complete register of the meeting to be transcribed later on, 
and lasting each one of them approximately one hour. The interviewees, except 
in one of the cases, were rather unobservant of the time and unmolested 
throughout the interview, a fact that provided a relaxed atmosphere were to 
discuss the questions. 
 
 
 
4.3. Data analysis 
 
The goal of analysing data is to investigate and present impartial evidence, 
which will be able to provide compelling conclusions, ruling out alternative 
explanations; as such it involves transforming the information gathered into 
descriptive statements by means of examining, categorizing, tabulating and 
testing the collected information to tackle the purpose of the study (Yin 1994: 
103; Yin 2003: 109). Following the work of Miles and Huberman (1994), data 
analysis comprises three separate proceedings. First, data reduction; it 
produces sharpener and more focused information by sorting, discarding, and 
organizing the existent information. Second, data display; in this stage the 
information is presented, organised and compressed in a manner that will help 
the elaboration of conclusions. Third, conclusion drawing and verification; the 
researcher confers a meaning to the findings while taking into account the 
existent irregularities, patterns, and seeks possible configurations. 
 
 
The current research follows the suggestions of Miles and Huberman (1994) 
explained above. The first step carried out was the verbatim transcription of the 
interviews; these were reviewed highlighting key sections to identify and later on 
sort them according to the theoretical construct. At this point the three separate 
analysis were assessed collectively to provide a holistic view on the issue 
regardless of the case were the information was taken, although acknowledging 
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to some extent their provenance in order to obtain a clearer picture of the issue. 
At last conclusions were drawn attending to the joint analysis and by means of 
a comparison with the theoretical construct. 
 
 
 
4.4. Trustworthiness of the study 
 
There are many views on the construction of qualitative research to ensure a 
rigorous outcome, most of them attending to the issues of validity and reliability 
(e.g. Kvale 1989; Yin 1994; Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Saunders et al. 2007), 
used to define the strength and correctness of the data. However, in this study 
the concept of trustworthiness will determine the quality of the study following 
the work of Lincoln and Guba (1985: 290); trustworthiness can be defined as a 
variable composed by the truth value of the findings, its applicability to other 
contexts, the consistency of its findings if the experiment is to be repeated, and 
the neutrality of the inquirer when approaching the subject. 
 
 
These are the four factors that condition the elaboration of a successful 
qualitative research and therefore should be used as foundations to build a 
study upon; hence these are the factors that will be taken into account to 
evaluate the present study according to the criteria proposed to measure them 
by the same authors (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 287 - 331), namely credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmatibility, which are the equivalent to the 
“conventional terms” internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity. 
These will be explained together with an account of their usage in the present 
study. 
 
 
Credibility is the operational term that demonstrates truth value. The researcher 
must demonstrate how the findings that have been arrived at, are credible. This 
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as the authors suggest (ibid. 296) poses a twofold task; conduct the research in 
a way that secures as much as possible the veracity of the findings, while at the 
same time those findings are approved by the constructors of the reality subject 
of study. To attain credibility three main techniques could be used, prolonged 
engagement, persistent observation and triangulation; peer debriefing provides 
an external check on the inquiry process, and also negative case analysis could 
be applied to refine the working hypotheses. Given the time restriction for the 
elaboration of this paper both prolonged engagement and persistent 
observation were dismissed; triangulation is present by the usage of various 
sources to tackle the same issues, and thus provide a clearer view on the 
validity of the framework used. A triangulation procedure for each case was 
intended, via a comparison with the views of the suppliers against those of the 
hub companies; however, it was dismissed due to the difficulties encountered in 
order to obtain the interviews where from to collect the data. Peer debriefing is 
present under the suggestions obtained from the guidance of a supervising 
professor, and also from the common discussions with other students who 
acted as an informal and perhaps naive supervising mechanism on the 
development of this paper. The last technique, negative case analysis was 
introduced throughout the data collection stage, via an inquiry on the 
assumptions of the model on the opposite case (i.e. inquiring into the 
characteristics of the environment when dealing with minor suppliers, the 
mechanisms used in the relationship, and testing the existence of learning in 
that case as well). 
 
 
Transferability refers to the extent to which working assumptions may be 
abstracted elsewhere, a function of the degree of similarity between sending 
and receiving contexts. However, to this issue the authors (ibid.) argue that “if 
there is to be transferability, the burden of proof lies less with the original 
investigator than with the person seeking to make an application elsewhere”. 
Therefore, only working hypotheses can be made, together with the time and 
context in which they were examined; the task to validate their transferability is 
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an empirical issue that depends on the similarity of the contexts where they are 
tested. To this regard it could be argued that the theoretical framework used on 
this study belongs to the context in which it was primarily assessed; hence, the 
purpose of this paper is partly to test the transferability and validity outside of 
the context described by Inkpen, since it is from his studies – Inkpen 1996 and 
Inkpen 1998 – that the current theoretical construct has been developed. In any 
case, the transferability of the study will be provided along with the conclusions 
found after analysing the data. 
 
 
Dependability refers, in words of the authors (ibid.), to the attribute of reliability, 
but taking a broader approach, which takes into account factors related to 
instability and also those associated with phenomenal or design induced 
change. The techniques suggested to test the dependability of the research are 
essentially the method of triangulation, already commented on above, stepwise 
replication, and inquiry audit. Stepwise replication follows a repetition approach 
on which a team is split to conduct the same research separately; a possibility 
out of reach in this case, given the fact that the research is to be carried out 
individually. The latter technique, inquiry audit, follows the same approach as 
the fiscal audit; an inspection to verify the accuracy and faithfulness of the data 
and the processes by which it was analysed and inferences were drawn, a task 
that it is in hand of the supervising methods that will be applied to review the 
present research. 
  
 
Confirmability is related primarily to objectivity and thus to the neutrality of the 
analysis, a difficult and troublesome criterion; the issue at stake is the objectivity 
or subjectivity of the data and the conclusions drawn. However, according to the 
authors (ibid.) “the issue is no longer the investigator’s characteristics but the 
characteristics of the data: Are they or are they not confirmable?”. Again in this 
case the main technique is to follow an audit that will prove the confirmability of 
the research. In this case, in addition to the discussion above concerning the 
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audit of the research, the complete raw data has been kept safe in paperback 
form and electronic register, as much as every step of the following processes 
and analysis carried out that lead to the conclusions drawn in this paper. Thus, 
the data used on every stage of the current paper can be traced and it is 
available in order to examine and to determine its confirmability. 
 
 
In summary, this chapter has presented the research approach of the study, 
providing arguments to support the choices taken regarding the type of study 
conducted, the data collection, and its analysis. Along has been provided, as 
well, an account of the limitations encountered, and thus the potential flaws of 
the study have been acknowledged. Furthermore, the issue of trustworthiness 
has been proposed, and its elements described, as the instrument to ensure the 
rigorous and accurate outcome of the study as a whole, especially on its 
empirical part – from the methodology followed, to the evaluation of the data 
gathered, and finally to the conclusions drawn – as it will be observed in the 
following sections. 
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5. STUDY FINDINGS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
 
This chapter will put forward the findings revealed by the empirical investigation 
following the framework presented earlier, attempting to provide answers to the 
questions purpose of this study. First, a brief introduction to each of the 
companies in the study will be provided, together with a succinct portrayal of 
their supply network. Second, the findings concerning learning environment, 
mechanisms, conditioning factors, and learning itself in the strategic supply 
network will be offered separately. Third, other findings and considerations will 
be offered concerning the differentiation between emergent and sought 
suppliers and other more general issues regarding learning and the strategic 
supply network. Fourth, the limitations encountered on the empirical part of the 
study will be presented and discussed. 
 
 
 
5.1. Supplier network 
 
Given the differences between the companies through which the empirical 
research of the study has been carried out, and although the results concerning 
the learning aspect will be offered through a holistic view on the cases, it seems 
necessary to provide an introductory and clarifying brief description of each of 
the cases regarding procurement; describing at the same time the environment 
in which the company operates. 
 
 
All the cases studied shared, nonetheless, the same view concerning 
procurement, and that is the avoidance of single sourcing. An approach too 
risky due to the dependent bond binding the firm to a single supplier; although 
keeping certain suppliers very close to the company it is necessary to keep a 
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distance that will provide leverage in case of need, as it is the case bearing in 
mind the current economic situation, acknowledged by all interviewees as well. 
The conditions created by the current economic downturn have introduced an 
unavoidable bias in supply management and thus affected the results of this 
study to a certain extent; therefore, they should be borne in mind especially 
throughout the succeeding empirical analysis of this paper. 
 
 
“If you are very close, then you are dependant, and it is very difficult to change 
and to get that advantages based on economical situation.” ABB’s interviewee. 
 
 
5.1.1. KWH Pipe 
 
KWH Pipe is part of the KWH group, which resulted from the acquisition in 1984 
of Wiik & Höglund, a timber company that had divested its operations in the 
plastic industry in the fifties, by Keppo, a highly prosperous and profitable fur 
producer. With its headquarters in Vaasa, Wiik & Höglund had already become 
the largest plastic producer in Finland during the sixties, and successfully 
internationalised its operations during the next decade. Plastics were 
maintained as the core activity of the group and KWH Pipe stands today as one 
of the world leaders in plastic pipes production and development, counting with 
production plants in Europe, Southeast Asia and North America. 
 
 
The information gathered concerning the supply network of the firm in the 
interview with its Production Coordination Manager refers only to its operations 
in Europe, production and procurement, and it is schematically described by the 
following figure (fig. 12). 
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Figure 12. KWH Pipe European supplier network. 
 
 
Given the substantial weight of the procurement of raw materials, around 80% 
of all purchases, an advantageous approach is the obtainment of economies of 
scale by purchasing high volumes, which benefits both parties, creating a win-
win situation. Thus, the strategy followed has been to shrink the number of 
suppliers to currently three, which although are treated differently, they are 
nevertheless considered strategic suppliers. Spot lots are purchased 
occasionally, but due to very high switching costs because of the specific 
requirements of the production, the relationship with the strategic suppliers is 
reinforced. Hence, the relation with suppliers has been built over a long period 
of time, and therefore can be labelled as emergent suppliers. Such 
development favours and environment where discussions are open, even 
informal at times, and the level of trust and familiarity are high, reaching the 
personal level of the employees involved. 
 
 
KWH Pipe has a significant record on innovation that has maintained 
throughout its history to the present. Through joint efforts with suppliers the 
company introduced the largest pipe diameter ever back in 1976 with the 
production of 1600mm diameter solid wall pipe; this efforts have continued by 
continuously engaging in joint-development projects with suppliers and other 
companies in the industry. 
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5.1.2. Wärtsilä – Power Plants Division 
 
Wärtislä started as a sawmill and iron works company back in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. It started showing interests in the ship industry through 
various acquisitions along the thirties, while continuing with its steel operations. 
In 1942 by a license agreement with Friedrich Krupp Germania Werft AG in 
Germany, the first diesel engine was produced, and thanks to the acquisition of 
NOHAB, a Swedish engine business, started its international career. After a 
turbulent decade in which merged with Lohja, the name Wärtsilä would 
reappear in 2000, rapidly boosting by a series of worldwide acquisitions, to 
stand today as a global leader with operations in one hundred and sixty 
locations spread across seventy countries. 
 
 
The firm presents three major divisions, Ship Power, Power Plants, focused in 
the marine and energy markets respectively, and the Service division 
supporting both operations. The case studied through the interview was its 
Power Plants division; nevertheless, as it will be shown the operations of the 
group are highly interrelated. 
 
 
The diagram below (fig. 13) offers a succinct view of Wärtsilä Power Plants 
supply network. Suppliers are divided according to the needs in all of Wärtsilä’s 
operations or just one of the divisions, category equipment and non-category 
equipment respectively. Due to its higher importance for the firm, the former is 
taken care by Corporate Supply Management, and the latter by the 
correspondent division, in this case Power Plants. While unfortunately not being 
able to produce the sharpest figures, approximately Power Plants makes use of 
about four hundred suppliers of a wider net of thousands used by the company 
as a whole. Of those, approximately two hundred could be considered strategic, 
or at least closer to the company, due to the reflections gathered in the 
interview with its Director of Supply Market Management. Despite the lack of a 
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clear definition or number of what are regarded by the company as key 
suppliers, about two hundred of them are invited every year and half to a 
supplier’s day, a fact that signals their importance for the firm. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Wärtsilä Power Plants supplier network. 
 
 
The supply network is managed by the overlapping efforts of Corporate Supply 
Management, in charge of the establishment of annual agreements, especially 
for category equipment, and the Power Plants division. Their whole production 
is project wise, making use of the engines built by the Ship Power division, 
which account for about 20% to 25% of the value, the rest is purchased by 
Power Plants to external suppliers. Supply is globally obtained, 60% of it is 
purchased to suppliers with whom an annual agreement exists; the rest is a 
mixed amount of spot purchases and purchases to suppliers with whom an 
annual agreement has not yet been settled. Nevertheless, although explicit 
partnership agreements do not exist, there are joint-developments with 
suppliers. 
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Suppliers are both emergent and sought. Those considered as key suppliers 
have been present for a long time, they know what it is expected, requirements 
are fulfilled while less supervision is enforced, and there is a lot of information 
shared back and forth; however, it seems that there is not any explicit alliance 
or partnership agreement, although with some companies collaboration is very 
close. That is a situation contrasting with newer suppliers, as the interviewee 
acknowledged: “If you compare that to a new supplier […] then it is a lot of work 
before you have that supplier to the same status”. In any case, a continuous 
scan is done at the same time on a global scale: “we have to continue looking 
for better solutions and cheaper solutions as well, since competition is getting 
stronger all the time”.  
 
 
5.1.3. ABB Finland 
 
ABB is the result of the merger in 1988 of the Swedish Asea with the Swiss 
BBC, both leading companies in the power technology industry, and with a 
background expanding for over a century on transformers, generators, 
automation, to even nuclear power. Furthermore, both of them had a 
remarkable innovative approach in the industry, which has been inherited by the 
resulting ABB. The firm grew fast after the merger by acquiring around forty 
companies in the first years, and along the last two decades its growth has 
continued while divesting activities, like oil, gas and petrochemicals, in order to 
focus on its core business, power and automation, where today it stands among 
the industry global leaders. The ABB group is divided in five major divisions – 
power products, power systems, automation products, process automation, and 
robotics – with operations spread over one hundred countries. 
 
 
Suppliers are divided following a twofold classification, first according to their 
production into direct, the vast majority, and indirect; direct materials are 
likewise subdivided into raw materials and value added products. Second, a 
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sharp differentiation regarding the policy to follow is provided by the use of 
Kraljic’s matrix (Kraljic 1983: 111 – see appendix 3). Strategic suppliers are 
those whose the importance is high due to characteristics like cost or value 
added, and at the same time the complexity of the supply market is high as well. 
Thus, from a supply network of almost eight thousand companies, the strategic 
relationships are narrowed down to about three hundred of them; as can be 
observed in the figure below (fig. 13); those three hundred suppliers represent 
80% of the total volume purchased and are considered close partnerships. It 
was observed also that the company can trace through its records every 
supplier ever used, an figure that amounts to about thirty thousand suppliers 
along its history. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. ABB supplier network. 
 
 
Procurement is managed globally, making use of the ABB’s advantageous 
position thanks to its volume scale and scope; a continuous scan is used to 
locate new supply opportunities. Therefore, new suppliers are sought 
continuously following the firm’s global needs but nevertheless, and at the same 
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time emergent relationships are present via a long shared history with an 
external company or former ABB activities, also companies owning specific 
technology with limited access in the market are kept closer. There are as well 
partnership agreements with some of them, in terms that can be reflected as the 
alliances referred in the literature, and there are joint-development projects with 
suppliers in seek of new solutions and developments. 
 
 
 
5.2. Findings and discussion 
 
Following mainly the work of Inkpen (1996; 1998), the conceptual framework of 
this study has proven to be a valuable tool to guide the empirical part of the 
research. The following will present separately the findings concerning the 
environment, mechanisms, conditioning factors, and learning itself in the 
strategic supply network. Each of the points will be accordingly discussed and 
critically reviewed.  
 
 
5.2.1. Facilitating factors 
 
The environment surrounding the strategic supply network is similar in all cases. 
Due to the fact that in the majority of the cases the supply relationship is 
measured and assessed in terms of price, quality, delivery times, and service, 
the learning approach is subdued to those to some extent. Nevertheless, 
flexible learning objectives are present guiding the seek of continuous 
improvements in all aspects of the relationship, from the product and processes 
themselves to logistics and the development of innovative approaches from 
which both parties can benefit, in many cases cost-based. 
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Leadership commitment is high within the strategic supply network; however, its 
learning facet appears to be blurred. Even though in some cases the 
commitment towards suppliers is demonstratively high, the learning aspect does 
not seem to be the driver of the sentiment, but the satisfactory history of the 
relationship itself, whether the reasons have been a mutually beneficial cost 
evolution, delivery times, payment conditions or an innovative approach towards 
product development that would enhance any or even all of the previous it is 
difficult to prove, owing probably mixed reasons and even reaching personal 
levels. “Companies don’t do business, only people make business”, remarked 
KWH Pipe interviewee. 
 
 
Trust encompasses the whole of the environment; however, it is tightly 
controlled by contracts used as clockwork mechanisms to regulate the 
relationship with suppliers. Even though trust must be the foundation and 
starting point on which to build a close relationship, in today’s world additional 
covenants are enforced. “If you go a lot of years back, it was more like trusting, 
but today there are agreements for everything”, commented Wärtsilä’s 
interviewee. Supervision mechanisms are present, although they are not heavily 
enforced on the strategic suppliers as they are usually on the rest of the supply 
companies. Towards the former a calmer behaviour is applied, signalling the 
trust deposited in them, in all the cases strategic suppliers are always regarded 
as trustworthy and responsible, they have proved that they can be relied upon. 
 
 
Through the empirical research no evidences have been found to neither 
confirm nor deny the existence of tolerance for redundancy or creative chaos. 
Both of them could be observed only in a setting where interdependency is so 
high that the interconnecting efforts of participant firms would overlap, creating 
an environment where no clear hierarchy is followed and therefore both of the 
aspects mentioned could emerge. Such environment could be found in close 
joint-development projects or joint ventures where the learning aspect is the 
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driving force and the efforts of the participants overlap in the common ground 
provided by the joint operation. As Inkpen (1996) argued, these factors could 
fuel the development of learning capabilities to a great extent, but not lacking 
disadvantages, unless engaging in a learning-driven joint operation it is just as 
good to avoid the problems that it could raise. 
 
 
As it was mentioned, performance is measured in terms that do not relate 
directly to a learning aspect, as such performance myopia – as defined by 
Inkpen (1996) – could be present to some extent. Given the current economic 
situation it is difficult to assess the learning aspect when pure market-based 
assessments, especially costs, have become a major issue. Nevertheless, it 
was mentioned along the interviews how sometimes the product itself is the 
goal of the supply relationship, which signals the importance of an inherent 
learning aspect built-in the relationship; a specific product to serve a purpose 
has to be jointly developed subject to certain constraints. As such, it seems on 
the one hand that if not stated otherwise market-based assessments rule the 
performance measurement of suppliers. On the other hand, it was 
acknowledged in all cases that suppliers play an important role in the 
performance of the company, and the developments suggested or provided by 
their efforts are of great importance. Therefore, the learning aspect is diluted in 
the whole performance assessment instead of being accounted as such. 
 
 
All in all, the environment found within the strategic supply network is a fruitful 
setting where learning is acknowledged and promoted, but at the same time the 
learning approach is diluted in the whole of the relationship. As such the 
learning aspect is evasive and apparently an indirect component of the 
relationship. The strategic supply network is managed on different terms than 
the rest of the supply network, kept closer due to its strategic importance for the 
firm, but except in the cases of joint-development operations the learning 
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aspect is not considered as such, instead it seems to be reviewed more as the 
reflection and outcome of a successful relationship than the cause of it. 
 
 
5.2.2. Mechanisms 
 
Regarding the mechanisms used to power the learning capabilities of a supplier 
relationship, information and technology sharing systems are used widely and 
on different levels in all cases. They are used basically to share information on 
issues such as cost, delivery times or quality, but transcend to provide a 
continuous communication with suppliers, through which the problems and 
difficulties are turned into beneficial feedback that is observed to yield the 
desired improvements. The larger companies – ABB and Wärtsilä – have 
established internet-based links with their suppliers, where information on 
general requirements can be retrieved, claims risen, and feedback provided in 
all levels. Suppliers are kept informed throughout the year so they are aware of 
the market situation, the actions taken by their client, and the needs for the 
succeeding period. This mechanism apart from linking both operations and 
easing the production process is a tie connecting the strategy of the firms 
involved, creating the strategic link that will be discussed below. 
 
 
The interactions are highly interrelated with the information and technology 
sharing as it can be seen above. In all cases it was clear that a continuous 
interaction is a must in order to obtain the expected results and to provide the 
base for mutual comprehension. Technical discussions are held continuously in 
order to enhance the current production, manufacture it cheaper or easier, and 
also concerning new developments. This requires the exchange of a great deal 
of information, sometimes reaching close to the core technology, information 
that is exchanged up and downstream along with the necessary feedback and 
under secrecy agreements. Feedback is expected and encouraged from 
suppliers especially from R&D departments, due to the fact that suppliers are 
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closer to the “real” issues and possess the expertise to know if certain designs 
are manageable or not, the cost needed for its production, and in many cases 
providing alternative solutions. In some cases the parties involved perform 
separate tests and jointly compare results. 
Personal meetings are arranged about once a year with strategic suppliers – an 
event called supplier’s day in the case of ABB and Wärtislä – to discuss the 
ongoing issues. It represents, as it was observed, a very good occasion that 
serves as a fruitful forum of ideas where to discuss the current trends of the 
market, share experiences with new materials, and analyse the upcoming 
designs and solutions in the industry. Along the year other meetings will be 
arranged in order to assess the performance, and if needed action plans will be 
set to correct the current issues in the quest for continuous improvements.  
 
 
The personnel transfers found in the empirical research are not more than 
company visits in the vast majority of the cases; staff rotation was not found, at 
least in the manner proposed in the model. Only in the case of ABB employees 
spend a few time with a supplier occasionally in order to gain an insight into the 
way of working. As in the case of tolerance for redundancy and creative chaos 
this seems to be a situation that could be found on a higher level of 
interdependency between firms, and only when the learning facet of the 
relationship is the major force, requiring then that resourceful employees could 
gather and disseminate the knowledge and information needed in order to 
inspire the learning needed in the relationship. 
 
 
In the same line of thought, the partner strategic link cannot be found in the 
terms reflected by Inkpen (1996), as the common goal of an alliance between 
firms, but nevertheless is present regarding the learning aspect in all cases by 
the exchange of ideas, usually on the mentioned yearly meetings. On these 
discussions to a varying degree the strategic plans are presented and 
discussed by all parties; an attempt that stretching the limits of the independent 
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organizations provides a common goal to the relationship and encourages its 
achievement. 
 
 
Through the mechanisms used in the relationship between the hub company 
and its strategic supplier network, it becomes clear that the learning approach is 
highly estimated and encouraged. In order to develop in all aspects different 
tools are used and the continuous interaction provides the ground to exchange 
ideas, solve the current problems, and develop the solutions to sort the 
challenges ahead. 
 
 
5.2.3. Conditioning factors 
 
Regardless of the overlap existing between the hub companies studied and 
their suppliers, the level of protectiveness in all cases can be considered high, 
although not really impenetrable. On the one hand core technology is kept apart 
and allegedly there is no will to share it with suppliers. On the other hand, 
especially in the cases of joint development where it is needed to offer 
information closer to the core knowledge and technology used, secrecy 
agreements are put forward to enable a closer association and exchange of 
valuable information, and furthermore to avoid any kind of leakage out to third 
parties, especially knowledge spillovers from the supplier to other of its clients, 
possible competitors of the hub company. This shows that if needed sensible 
and valuable information is shared with suppliers under strict secrecy 
conditions, trying to keep a balance between the right to protect their core 
technology – in-house developed knowledge core of their market 
competitiveness – and the necessity to share it in order to develop it further with 
the additional assistance of competent and skilful suppliers in the field. 
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In all cases it was mentioned the fact that through the company visits organised 
for suppliers, certain production designs were kept apart. The reasons in all 
cases point to their position among other competitors, and the need to keep 
certain things only for themselves since it would be too risky if certain 
information would leak outside, threatening their market position. Likewise it 
was believed in all cases that suppliers do not share all their knowledge and 
capabilities for the same reasons. Even so, and regardless of binding 
agreements or contracts, within the strategic supplier network all information 
that could be sensible to other parties is managed with great care. 
 
 
Regarding tacitness it has been unfeasible to obtain any significant data to that 
respect. It was acknowledged that problems arise sometimes when trying to 
understand each other’s points of view, but those situations are minimized as 
much as possible by a continuous flow of information and in all cases by the 
use of technical data that constitutes a shared language understood by all 
parties involved. Therefore, the level of tacitness in the cases studied should be 
low thanks to the shared technical language used, and given the fact that their 
knowledge overlaps to some extent all participants are aware of the type, 
meaning, and goal of the information exchanged, despite its differing 
complexity. However, a specific study to tackle the issue should be carried out 
focusing expressly on the knowledge subject of exchange by the different 
parties. 
 
 
Grouping protectiveness and tacitness into the accessibility factor, as the 
research frameworks indicates, it could be said that information is made 
accessible only if needed and subject to secrecy agreements to prevent any 
kind of leakage to outsider. As such accessibility is possible and it is provided 
only in order to expand knowledge further; the closer it gets to the core 
knowledge the harder it is to get access to it and the stronger the controls 
enforced. This proves that even though information is seemingly not given away 
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easily, it is actually shared in the cases where it is most needed. When it comes 
to new developments and the learning capabilities can be used and enhanced 
by the knowledge of others, accessibility is provided and reasonable barriers 
are enforced to constrain the benefits of the learning capabilities only the 
parties involved on its development. 
 
 
Concerning knowledge connections, as it has been reported and commented 
on above, through the information and technology sharing systems and the 
interactions conveyed by them, the opportune knowledge connections are 
established. These connections apply to all levels of the relationship guiding the 
conveyance of the more technical information, and easing the discussions over 
it; marketing and sales department are interconnected as well, and furthermore 
to some extent – although not fully – the strategic functions of the companies 
are aware of the future prospects that can be expected from the relationship. 
 
 
Considering the fact that all companies belong to the same industry, and 
constitute different but immediately successive links in the industry chain, the 
relatedness of knowledge overlaps to different extents, depending on the 
supplier. Nevertheless, suppliers and hub companies interact on a shared 
knowledge base. The amount of relatedness existent in the interaction allows 
for a continuous feedback; the developments provided by the R&D function are 
discussed with the relevant supplier who considers the feasibility and offers 
suggestions that pass unnoticed to R&D due to the expertise and experience of 
the supplier. As the ABB interviewee reflected “our R&D engineers, they are not 
experts in the manufacturing capabilities of suppliers […] suppliers many times 
know better what products and techniques you should use”. This evidences at 
the same time the fact that knowledge relatedness is adequate to work 
together, and not sufficient enough to successfully advance alone, a situation 
that provides a fertile joint learning opportunity. 
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The cultural alignment described by Inkpen (1998) as learning-oriented 
expectations has not been clearly obtained. The will to cooperate with strategic 
suppliers is a clear need and beneficial requirement to their own progress, and 
this feature is developed within the relationship with strategic suppliers thanks 
to the already mentioned facilitating factors and mechanisms; however, the 
cultural alignment learning perspective is not clear as much as the commitment 
to continuously improve and work in the relationship with suppliers in order to 
steadily obtain improvements, chiefly considering economic and competitive 
aspects. Nevertheless, it was mentioned in all cases that the easiness of the 
relation with suppliers improved thanks to a culture wise factor; it is easier to 
deal with culturally closer counterparts, a characteristics that far from the 
learning perspective relate to purely cultural similarities in all aspects that 
ultimately are related to geographical distance. 
 
 
The above knowledge connections, relatedness, and cultural alignment can be 
grouped together following the framework into learning effectiveness; however, 
as such not much can be said about it as a group, neither a figure or amount 
can be established. Nevertheless, all in all, learning can be attained especially 
attending to the existent knowledge connections and knowledge relatedness, 
which represent a fruitful and advantageous common ground, where to develop 
the relationship to the obtainment of its beneficial outcomes. 
 
 
5.2.4. Learning 
 
In all the cases studied, a learning approach is promoted in the relationship with 
strategic suppliers; progress in all aspects is encouraged in the pursuit of a 
mutually beneficial situation for the parties involved. In all of the cases the 
companies have been involved in joint development projects and other closer 
collaboration endeavours with strategic suppliers, although it was difficult for the 
interviewees to pinpoint the exact developments obtained as a result. This is 
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due to the fact that development as much as the learning process is reflected 
continuously in all the company processes; a fact noted by the Wärtsilä 
interviewee: “we don’t have this kind like in the car industry, they have year 
makes […] we have more continuous development”. Nevertheless, he was also 
able to discern a higher level in that continuous process; “the major changes 
are of course when we do the agreements, then we collect the feedback […] 
and give it to the suppliers […] then you get steps […] at that time I think is a 
little bit more, but it’s not stopped, it’s more continuous”. Due to the type of 
production in all cases learning is an ongoing continuous process from which 
developments follow the same pace.  
 
 
However, not all the cases are the same, depending on the complexity and the 
integration needed with the final product the level of interaction differs; when 
those are high the level of interaction and interrelation grows accordingly. In this 
manner both firms are bond to work together, else their separate efforts will not 
result in the outcome needed, collaboration is then a must to stay ahead. 
Another issue in the yield and fertility of interlinked efforts in development is 
given by the collaboration with suppliers who count with their own R&D 
departments; it was mentioned how in that case the productivity and the value 
of the outcome expected is usually higher according to the efforts and 
resources that have been put at work. Whichever is the case, milestones such 
as patents and cutting-edge innovative designs have been registered 
unceasingly along their history, proving their innovative approach and providing 
the competitive advantage needed to remain ahead of the competition in their 
respective markets worldwide. 
 
 
Stepping back from the details to get a broader and clearer view on learning, it 
seems that the outcomes of learning and the process itself is regarded following 
a twofold perspective, through which learning in the relationship with strategic 
suppliers is reckoned as the historic development in performance, and learning 
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outcomes per se. On the one hand, following the first view – the historic 
development in performance – the outcomes of the relationship with strategic 
suppliers that account as learning in the relationship are diluted in a broader 
picture that is measured by the performance used in assessing the same 
suppliers. Among them one can point out especially costs reductions, accuracy 
in delivery times, improvements in services, and refinements in quality, which 
can be considered perhaps subtler learning outcomes, but learning 
nonetheless. These are the result of a continuous effort by all parties and a 
constant exchange of feedback towards the amelioration of the relationship, 
products and processes that links the companies together. However, due to the 
fact that these outcomes are found spread throughout many aspects of the 
relationship, they are diluted in the whole relationship and packed together in 
the increasing performance that any relationship requires to be maintained in 
the future, their learning facet blurred after being mixed with purely economic 
performance results. 
 
 
On the other hand there is learning per se, a division where only the latest 
innovations, patents, designs, and working procedures can be found, and due 
to their significance and visibility are usually regarded as THE learning 
outcomes. According to this, learning is in many occasions understood rather 
narrowly as the edge-cutting accomplishments, those that act as signalling 
flares marking the path of the company throughout its life and thus highlighted 
and remarked by management as the milestones of the firm’s approach to 
business. In any case these are to differing extents joint efforts on which the 
knowledge and expertise of suppliers is critical to the success of the final 
output, as it was indicated by the interviewees. 
 
 
From the recollection above it can be argued that learning is present in 
everyday situations just as much as it is in R&D premises, but most of the 
learning processes and outcomes are elusive because their functioning runs on 
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the background in ways that are widely regarded as supplier and company 
performance. Therefore, especially within the strategic supply network on which 
the level of interconnection is high, all sorts of interactions should be taken into 
account, just as much as the R&D projects or costly joint developments, for 
suppliers can play a major role in the latest state-of-the-art outcomes just as 
much as they ease, soothe, and improve the firm’s production and processes as 
a whole. 
 
 
In relation with the ad hoc division between learning as general developments 
in performance and learning per se, it could be argued that they relate to a 
certain extent, respectively, to the exploitative and explorative approaches of 
learning. Exploitative would be the learning understood as performance; the 
goal is to implement the whole of the relationship, enhancing all the 
intermediate processes, which will result in an improved final product. This 
process is characterised by the reinforcement of the current mechanisms by the 
experience acquired after using them constantly, looking for deficiencies to 
correct and the improvements that could be applied. However, as it was 
explained along the theoretical review above (see 3.2.1. Learning strata – 
Exploitation & exploration), an exclusive focus on exploitation leads to 
incompetency in the long run due to the lack of new ideas and the development 
of new knowledge; that is the use of the explorative facet of learning. In this 
case what has been regarded as learning per se, accounts partly for an 
exploitative approach, but it is as well the most important source of new ideas, 
which fuel the creation of the knowledge that provides new capabilities in 
production, expanding possibilities for the parties involved. 
 
 
As it has been shown the strategic supply network plays a fundamental role in 
both exploitation and exploration, and thus in the learning capabilities of the firm 
by making use of the knowledge and potential of its strategic supply network. 
Strategic suppliers are to some extent the source of competitive advantage via 
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the contributions they can provide to enhance production as a whole – 
characterised by cost, quality, delivery times and service – and furthermore 
through their involvement in the seek of newer solutions. Learning is subtly 
embedded in the relationship with strategic suppliers as a whole, and it blooms 
distinctly thanks to its most innovative side in joint developments and other 
forms of close collaboration, by which the latest products, solutions, patents and 
other forms of knowledge come to be. 
 
 
 
5.3. Other reflections 
 
There is a distinction between emergent and sought strategic suppliers, the 
former are suppliers who develop a valuable strategic facet due to their 
importance as a supplier and the constant relations maintained with a hub 
company; while the latter consist of outstanding players in the industry with 
whom the hub company has started its operations after performing a wide 
benchmark looking for suppliers whose importance and remarkable record 
suggests a profitable outcome from the relationship. As described in the 
analysis on the supply network of Wärsilä and ABB, a constant scan is 
maintained to locate those outstanding suppliers; however, despite what their 
record and pre-assessment might suggest, the fact that prior to a closer 
cooperation and inclusion in the sphere of strategic suppliers, they are subject 
as well to a close examination and follow up. Hence, before considered fully as 
strategic suppliers, the assessment to which they are subject works as an 
integration process; the mechanisms presented and used as the framework of 
this study are established first to provide the development of the environment 
described above as well. Without the existence of the appropriate mechanisms 
to tie up the laces between companies, the suitable environment will not 
flourish, thus the relationship will not be upgraded to strategic, and collaboration 
will not be as close to allow its full potential. Ergo, learning is hindered by the 
 81 
lack of the appropriate mechanisms and environment first, and then influenced 
by other conditioning factors, present as well in the model. 
 
 
Following the framework together with the observations from the interviews, the 
position of emergent suppliers is more favourable towards a learning approach 
due to the existence of the pertinent mechanisms and environment; a sought 
supplier requires a development through time to evolve, and thus by the time it 
is upgraded to the same level as existent strategic supplier the relationship has 
developed and the borders between sought and emergent are not clear 
anymore. This situation seems consistent in the case of pure supplier 
relationships but not in the case of other operations where learning is the goal 
by definition (e.g. joint developments aimed at the production of new 
technology), as it has been acknowledged in the limitations of the research (see 
1.2. Purpose, scope and limitations of the study).  
 
 
Regarding other impressions provided by the information gathered throughout 
the research it should be noticed, following the research and views of New and 
Mitropoulos (1995) that although a useful theoretical approach, the network 
vision proposed by this study clashes with empirical observations; as the 
research indicated, managers find the notion of a network environment hard to 
operate with in reality, being replaced by individual relationships with different 
strategic suppliers. In most of the cases although collective meetings and other 
events were organised, the necessity – accentuated by the current economic 
downturn – of maintaining separate strategies for each supplier, obliged the hub 
firm to keep and provide certain information individually to each one of its 
suppliers. This behaviour is far from the networked management approach that 
would be ideal, as the Toyota case exemplifies (see 3.3.2. The Toyota case). 
However, the Toyota case provided as an example of a rather perfectly 
managed networked environment is probably one of the best examples and far 
from that, not all companies share the same views towards close collaboration 
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and free information flow to boost the learning possibilities; each industry is 
determined by a different set of characteristics and thus each company within 
its own industry is affected by different issues, and chooses its own way of 
action to make the best out of it. 
 
 
On a more theoretical approach it seems evident that looking at the broad 
picture, although formed by independent entities, the strategic supply network 
acts guided by the requirements of the hub company and thus proceeds as a 
whole towards a set of objectives. Despite the level of awareness or 
manageability of this motion, powered primarily by economic ambitions such as 
cost reductions, improvements in delivery times, or refinements in quality, the 
underlying fuel is in all cases learning applied jointly to a proposed set of goals, 
and that movement drives the strategic network together towards continuously 
updated aspirations, reinforcing constantly as well the network significance. 
 
 
Finally, it should be highlighted the fact that all the interviews were carried in 
Vaasa, where all the companies have placed a significant volume of operations, 
and in two of the three cases a certain amount of strategic suppliers were 
located as well in the vicinity, a factor that points in the direction of what have 
been regarded as clusters thanks to their geographical proximity. Strategic 
suppliers have emerged along in the surroundings of a developing hub 
company, and which were adduced in both cases to have been engaged in 
fruitful learning relationships. Although on smaller scale it nevertheless makes 
one think of learning and innovation clusters, such as the widely known Silicon 
Valley located in California, or the much closer Kista, in the suburbs of 
Stockholm. 
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5.4. Limitations 
 
A major shortcoming in the study has been the absence of the suppliers’ view 
on the relationship with each of the hub companies. The information provided 
by the hub companies presents to some extent a bias, which could be balanced 
by the equally biased view of the relationship offered by some of the strategic 
suppliers. In addition to the problematic encountered in order to obtain data 
through interviews, another issue is the lack of a supplier stereotype, being 
necessary to contrast the views of several to obtain a consistent view of the 
supply side. To this regard it should be pointed out the impossibility by the 
interviewees – excepting KWH Pipe given the size of its strategic supply 
network – to pinpoint their most significant relationships with which learning is 
expressly developed. Each one of their supply relationships is viewed 
separately and differently, each supplier provides different inputs and the 
learning perspective is differently encouraged and developed. A deeper study 
on the matter should be utilised in order to obtain what could be regarded as a 
stereotype strategic supply relationship from a learning perspective. 
 
 
Another unavoidable drawback has been the current economic situation on 
which many companies are striving to survive, and consequently the 
opportunities to obtain respondents available for interviews has acutely 
diminished. The companies whose assistance has made possible the conduct 
of the present study are facing as well the economic downturn and such 
environment was commented on by all interviewees; thus, it should be noted 
that the present circumstances have a severe influence on the management of 
supplier relationships, strategic or not; affecting the firm and respondents 
behaviour towards procurement, it pervades to some extent the information 
provided in the interviews, and that it has, as well, permeated to the analysis 
and conclusions. Nevertheless, the analysis has tried to leave aside as much as 
possible the somehow unconventional perspective towards supply relationships 
induced by the unconventional present circumstances. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This final chapter is intended to present first a summary of the study and its 
conclusions, offering an account of the findings reached to, and explained from 
a holistic point of view; second, the practical implications of the findings will be 
commented on, to finish with the third part in which suggestions for future 
research will be proposed. 
 
 
 
6.1. Summary of the study 
 
It was the intention of this study to examine the learning process within the 
strategic supply network of the firm through the views and behaviour of a hub 
company towards its main suppliers, an objective that was researched through 
a set of five narrower questions inquiring into the classification of suppliers, the 
development needed to become strategic for the hub firm, the characteristics of 
the environment in which the relationship is developed, the mechanisms used 
to attain learning, the conditions of knowledge for learning to take place, and 
the outcome generated. 
 
 
Prior to exploring these issues, a basic and guiding ground has been provided 
by delving into the literature existent on the supply network of the firm, and on 
inter-organizational learning, attempting furthermore to establish a consistent 
link between what seems to be separate approaches. The pioneering work on 
the network hypothesis is followed by the intertwined developments on its 
theoretical and empirical approaches; the literature review offers also the 
current views ob the subject, contrasting at times, what provides a middle 
ground that can satisfy both arguments simultaneously and which will help the 
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study carried out on the empirical part. The strategic value of the supply 
network is thus established. 
 
 
Likewise, the basics of organizational learning were presented, and the locus of 
inter-organizational learning was determined to follow with what is considered 
learning in a network. The current division between learning as exploitation and 
exploration was introduced, also providing as well the drawbacks of inter-
organizational learning. Finally, following the work of Inkpen (1996; 1998) a 
theoretical framework was developed, which took into account the ideas of the 
latter to study the environment, mechanisms and characteristics of knowledge 
and the learning outcome obtained. Furthermore, an exemplifying precedent 
was provided, the Toyota case, a leading paradigm on the field of inter-
organizational learning that brought the theoretical approach to a real case. 
 
 
The study was carried out on three global leaders on their respective industries 
with a significant volume of operations in the area of Vaasa. The analysis of the 
data was done based on the theoretical framework constructed, isolating 
different strata in the process; thus, the environment, mechanisms, conditioning 
factors and ultimate outcomes of learning have been examined. 
 
 
The results indicate that a common environment is present in the relationship 
with what can be regarded as strategic suppliers. Although, as it has been 
noted, there are legal agreements to which the relationship is subject, the level 
of trust is rather high, an essential quality in the development of a successful 
relation. There is a significant level of commitment in the high hierarchical 
positions accompanied by flexible objectives, and an essentially market based 
performance system. As it has been discussed already the learning aspect 
seems to be diluted in the relationship as a whole. There was no worthwhile 
findings relating to tolerance for redundancy nor to creative chaos, attributes 
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that seem to suit more situations of the highest interdependence, such as close 
joint-developments and joint-ventures. 
 
 
The information channels between the hub company and strategic suppliers are 
constantly open, and information is continuously exchanged regarding problems 
encountered, upcoming needs, technical feedback, and future development 
issues that should be tackled. This is partly done via telematic tools such as 
internet based communication systems that run together with the purchasing 
and operations systems or solely intended for communication and feedback. 
Information from all levels is exchanged and especially concerning technical 
developments. Personnel transfers are rather inexistent in the terms described 
by the theoretical framework. There are also constant meetings with strategic 
suppliers on which future issues are discussed, from production volumes to 
improvements in all areas of production and the final product as well; forecasts 
are made available for suppliers, although usually provided individually to each 
supplier. All in all, a partner strategic link exists linking the strategies of the 
companies involved towards a common goal, usually produced by the hub 
company, given its central role and closer position to the market, on which it has 
a better view and understanding. 
 
 
Information is highly protected but nevertheless made accessible if required, 
and although core technology is not intended to be shared with suppliers on 
certain joint developments, they might get quite close to it, reason why secrecy 
agreements are always enforced. The knowledge connections are established 
rather successfully by the mechanisms implemented, providing a constant 
exchange of information to the adequate personnel, where it can be discussed, 
a fact that also signals the quite high level of relatedness between the 
knowledge of the companies; they are nonetheless connected links in the chain 
from raw materials to final production and market. There is no definite 
information on which to claim a strict cultural alignment between the parties; in 
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most of the cases the geographical proximity nurtures a successful relationship 
given their similar approach and behaviour. Lastly, concerning the tacit aspect 
of the knowledge involved in the relationship there is no data available on which 
to base an analysis; a specific research on the topic would be required. 
 
 
Regarding learning itself and its outcomes, it seems that although the learning 
aspect is diluted within the supply relationship and its overall performance, its 
results are quite visible. In all cases the performance of the hub company has 
admittedly improved thanks to the efforts provided by the supplying parties 
regarded as strategic for the company. In the line discussed on the analysis, 
learning is found to take the mentioned exploitative and explorative approaches 
– learning as a historic development in performance and learning per se, 
respectively – thus, through the former improvements in product and processes 
are attained, while the latter pursues an innovative approach that will enable 
new developments and designs to face the evolution of the market providing 
constantly newer solutions. 
 
 
Throughout the analysis of the data, additional conclusions have been arrived 
at. First, the difference between emergent and sought supplier does not pose a 
major distinction regarding the learning potential of the relationship; the latter is 
required to pass a probing period after which it will be considered a valuable 
strategic supplier – or dismissed otherwise – therefore after the probing period a 
sought supplier will be tinted with emergent characteristics, making it hard to 
discern a separate outcome in the learning process since that sought supplier 
has to a great extent grown emergent into the strategic level. 
Second, as argued by New and Mitropoulos (1995), the network paradigm is 
not thus observed by the management interviewed. While its theoretical 
approach seems perfectly valid, management regards the supply network of the 
firm in terms of dyadic exchange in most of the cases. Although the Toyota 
case poses an empirical example of networked procurement practices, this 
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outstanding case might be so due to its remarkably uniqueness. It is clear that a 
network approach to procurement is not a widespread practice. 
Third, it should be reckoned, in opposition to the reflection above, that although 
perhaps not managed as a network, strategic suppliers move as a whole entity 
towards the objectives marked by the leading hub company in terms of 
performance expected, developments and improvements needed. The hub 
company by its closer feel of the market sets, and discusses too, the objectives 
needed to succeed, acting as a beacon for the strategic suppliers, and thus the 
network proceeds as a whole. 
 
 
 
6.2. Empirical implications 
 
The findings show that there is a significant space for improvements in the 
management of supplier networks, and especially regarding its learning aspect. 
Learning is an outcome that results in progress all the time but there is the need 
of guidance to exploit the process and harness profitably its results. The 
responsibility falls on the supply management function of the firm, who are 
aware of the whole array of suppliers available, their characteristics and 
importance. From a learning perspective it would be advisable to highlight the 
importance of suppliers in terms of the potential developments, and although 
they are highly interconnected with market-based assessments, separate them 
as much as possible in order to obtain a clearer view on the prospect of 
learning attainable by the supply network. 
 
 
In views of the success obtained by the Toyota network system, it would be as 
well advisable to follow a high performing approach towards procurement in a 
similar manner. Suppliers are tightly connected to the hub company and 
likewise among themselves, providing a strong interconnection, a highly 
responsive working method, and most important a highly efficient and effective 
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learning network supporting the obtainment of innovative products and 
enhancing the firm’s processes, pillars to the development of competitive 
advantage. 
 
 
 
6.3. Suggestions for further research 
 
The research concluding here arises several facets that would be worth 
inquiring into. First of all, given the limitations encountered in the present 
research, additional investigations could provide a wider understanding in terms 
of the differences between industries concerning learning within the strategic 
supply network. The results could determine the importance of the strategic 
supply network in terms of learning outcomes depending on the industry, and 
thus the significance of the strategic supply network and its perhaps differing 
usefulness. 
 
 
Regarding the innovative approach of learning it would be interesting to obtain 
richer as well as deeper information on the locus of learning and its innovation 
outcomes. Whether it is the network, the alliance, or the firm on its own who 
produce learning and innovation would provide a definite insight into the 
strategic value of the network, the alliance, or none of them. It could provide as 
well an understanding on the conveyance or “transfusion” of innovation 
throughout clients and suppliers, a novel approach that can provide a new 
insight in the learning process and innovation development, and the paper 
played by the strategic supply network in this process. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Interview details 
 
Date Location Company – Interviewee’s position 
07.05.2009 Vaasa KWH Pipe – Manager of production coordination 
19.05.2009 Vaasa Wärtsilä – Director of Supply market management 
(Power plants) 
03.06.2009 Vaasa ABB – Vice President Local SCM services 
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Appendix 2  
 
 
Semi-structured interview questionnaire 
 
 
General questions 
 What do you buy from your suppliers? How many suppliers do you 
have? 
 Are you responsible for the whole supply network or is your focus a 
specific segment or number? 
 Is there a classification or grouping between the suppliers? According 
to what factors (added value, production complexity…)? 
 Are they all treated the same way or there are different levels of 
familiarity, trust and understanding? 
 Are they treated following an “arm’s-length” approach or are there 
interdependencies and a strong relationship with any of them? 
 Among the suppliers is there any formal “alliance” agreement? Would 
you say there is a similar tacit agreement with any of them? 
 How were the most important suppliers chosen? 
 
Environment 
 How do you see the relationship with your suppliers?  
 What do you expect from them? 
 Are there any supervision mechanisms to meet expectations? 
 What are the problems?  
 Learning Mechanisms 
 How does information sharing takes place? 
 Do you hold regular meetings, seminars, training sessions, company 
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visits etc. with your suppliers? Vice versa? 
 Do you update your suppliers with information about what you need 
and expect from them? 
 
 Is technology transferred between you and your suppliers? 
 
 Is personnel being sent or transferred to acquire knowledge and 
information from the supplier’s side? 
 
 Are strategic future plans shared with suppliers? 
 
Determinants 
 Are you willing to share core technologies with your suppliers if 
needed? Are they willing to do the same? 
 
 Are there comprehension difficulties when sharing information with the 
suppliers? 
 
 Is there a connection between the values held by this company and 
those of the suppliers? 
 
Learning 
 Has the learning aspect been promoted in the relationship with 
suppliers? 
  Has the relationship with the strategic suppliers materialized in any 
kind of innovative mechanism or procedure?  
 Do the supplies collaborate with new ideas to enhance the processes 
or production and in problem solving activities? 
 Has the relationship with suppliers affected in any way the efficiency or 
performance of the company? And the relationship itself? 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Kraljic’s matrix 
 
Importance of 
purchasing H
ig
h
  II 
Materials 
Management 
 IV 
Supply 
management 
 
Criteria: cost of 
Materials/total 
costs, value- 
added profile, 
profitability 
profile, and so 
on. 
 Procurement focus 
Leverage items 
Key performance 
criteria 
Cost/price and 
materials flow 
management 
Typical sources 
Multiple suppliers, 
chiefly local 
 
Time horizon 
Varied, typically 12 
to 24 months 
Items purchased 
Mix of commodities 
and specified 
materials 
Supply 
Abundant 
Decision 
authority 
Mainly 
decentralized 
Procurement focus 
Strategic items 
Key performance 
criteria 
Long-term availability 
Typical sources 
Established global 
suppliers 
 
Time horizon 
Up to ten years; 
governed by long-term 
strategic impact 
Items purchased 
Scarce and or high-
value materials 
Supply 
Natural scarcity 
Decision authority 
Centralized 
I 
Purchasing 
management 
 III 
Sourcing 
management 
 
Procurement focus 
Noncritical items 
Key performance 
criteria 
Functional efficiency 
Typical sources 
Established local 
suppliers 
 
Time horizon 
Limited; normally 
12 months or less 
Items purchased 
Commodities, 
some specified 
materials 
Supply 
Abundant 
Decision 
authority 
Decentralized 
Procurement focus 
Bottleneck items 
Key performance 
criteria 
Cost management 
and reliable short-
term sourcing 
Typical sources 
Global, 
predominantly new 
suppliers with new 
technology 
 
Time horizon 
Variable, depending on 
availability vs short-term 
flexibility trade-offs 
Items purchased 
Mainly specified 
materials 
Supply 
Production-based 
scarcity 
Decision authority 
Decentralized but 
centrally coordinated L
o
w
 
 Low 
 
High 
 Complexity of 
supply market 
Criteria: supply, monopoly or oligopoly 
conditions, pace of technological 
advance, entry barriers, logistics cost 
and complexity, and so on. 
 
 
 
Stages of purchasing sophistication (adapted from Kraljic 1983: 111). 
